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ABSTRACT
In order to capture the business dynamics underlying SOA-based service systems,
we propose and formalize the concept of a competitive service market (CSM). A CSM is
composed of a set of composite service providers, each managing a collection of atomic
service providers. With the help of service composition protocol, composite service
providers are able to invoke atomic services and aggregate them into value-added com-
posite services for servicing various types of customers’ requests. Centering around the
setting of a competitive service market, our research is separated into three parts:
1. Aiming to support the quantitative-based decision processes of diﬀerent market
players, we construct stochastic models to conduct performance analysis at various
levels spanning vertically on the structural hierarchy of the service market.
2. In the context of requirements analysis, we classify the concept of service and
service instance in terms of their respective functional and non-functional features.
Hereafter, we identify the related storage issues and propose a counting Bloom
ﬁlter-based hybrid storage architecture for the service registry design underlying
the service market. A feature-based service discovery protocol is developed to
demonstrate the usefulness of this design.
3. The business relationship between diﬀerent market players are typically framed
through the service level agreements (SLAs), which specify the attributes of QoS-
based metrics and service costs for the realized service provisioning. SLAs con-
stitute the backbone structure for managing the CSM. We identify several SLA
ix
design patterns in terms of diﬀerent business scenarios that can occur in the life
cycle of a service market. Against each pattern we study the corresponding SLA
design scheme that can meet its unique requirements. In addition, we systemat-
ically investigate the application of Bayes estimator in these schemes, since the
knowledge of their negotiation counterpart or market competitors is essential for
reaching the goal of utility optimization. At the end, we cast the hybrid SLA
design framework into a stochastic model that allows decision makers to obtain
evaluations of performance of interest.
1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
Services computing has two main objectives: maximize the utilization of the existing
business assets and increase the capability of satisfying the ever-changing market re-
quirements, which are essential to ensure the sustainable competitive edge in the global
supply chain. An agile business product line should be able to horizontally span com-
pany walls while supporting multiple business functionalities and multiple types of users.
The ever-increasing computational power and the wide deployment of internet service
provide strong support to help the enterprises achieve the goal of services computing.
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) provides a ﬂexible and extensible platform to
instantiate the business management philosophy of services computing. It introduces
two primary business advantages [1][2]:
• The adoption of SOA-based resource management architecture enables the business
ﬁrm to save cost by leveraging existing software and hardware assets.
• The embedded universally agreed-upon speciﬁcations allow the enterprises to de-
liver various types of business applications through the enterprise-wide service
composition or business-to-business application integration in an automatic way.
Thriving and diverse service-oriented applications across diﬀerent business spectrums
motivate us to address the related theoretical research from a deeper business oriented
thought. Pertaining to this vision, we formalize the concept of Competitive Service
Market (CSM) as an generic framework to study the business dynamics for various
service systems implemented either on the Web or on other platforms [3].
21.1 Background
A competitive service market is formulated as CSM = {ASP , CSP,AS}, where
• ASP = {aspi : i = 1, . . . , ‖ASP‖}: ASP is a set of atomic service providers, de-
noted by aspi, which is assumed to embed with self-contained functionality without
needing the cooperation of other agents to provide a speciﬁc type of service.
• CSP = {cspi : i = 1, . . . , ‖CSP‖}: CSP is a set of composite service providers,
denoted by cspi, which can invoke several atomic service providers in a service
composition process.
• AS = {ASi : i = 1, . . . , ‖AS‖}: AS is a set of atomic services existing in the
market.
Here, ‖ASP‖, ‖CSP‖ and ‖AS‖ stand for the sizes of sets ASP , CSP and AS, respec-
tively. Atomic services act as the basic units in a service system. The realization of
their functionalities does not require the involvement of other units. On the other hand,
service composition protocol aggregates several atomic services into a composite service
controlled by a given business logic and then delivers it to the customer [4]. The service
composition process enables a collection of heterogeneous service providers to collaborate
in a virtual coalition that can span across diﬀerent enterprises. In the CSM setting, the
service composition protocol is owned and deployed by the composite service providers,
which aslo act as the interface between the consumers and the market, whereas atomic
service providers are hidden from the consumers.
Figure.1.1 illustrates an example of a competitive service market. The market has two
composite service providers: composite service provider 1 and composite service provider
2. Through the service composition protocol, composite service provider 1 can invoke
the atomic services provided by content service 1, information system 2, information
system 3 and marketing service while composite service provider 2 can invoke the atomic
3services provided by content service 2, information system 3, information system 1 and
marketing service.
Figure 1.1 An example of competitive service market
Figure.1.2 displays a composite service that is able to be composed by composite
service provider 2. This composite service describes the workﬂow of a content service
provisioning process. In Figure.1.2, the information system 2 is an information infras-
tructure service provider which provides storage space for electronic medias, such as
movies and on-line games. The content service 1 is a content service provider which
can add unique features developed in-house to the media based on customers’ vari-
ous requirements. A specialized marketing consultant, i.e., marketing service shown in
Figure.1.2 is also hired to improve the market share and manage the customer service.
From the topological point of view, each composite service can be treated as a work-
ﬂow graph, in which a vertex represents an atomic service and an edge stands for the busi-
4Figure 1.2 An example of composite service
ness logic underlying the composite service. Figure. 1.3 illustrates a composite service ex-
ample consisting of eight atomic services, which is denoted asS = {AS1, AS2, . . . , AS8}.
In our research, we use S to denote the composite service.
Figure 1.3 An example of composite service
With respect to a given composite service provider, cspo, we deﬁne the set of atomic
service providers maintaining the business relationship with cspo as controlled group
denoted as CGo. The business relationship between a composite service provider and
an atomic service provider belonging to its controlled group is framed as the service
level agreement (SLA) which will be investigated in detail later. Figure.1.4 shows a
conceptual diagram of cspo and its controlled group. In our research, we use CGto to
represent a set of atomic service providers which belong to CGo and provide the same
type of atomic service identiﬁed with superscript t.
In the example shown in Figure.1.4, we have CGo = CG1o∪CG2o∪CG3o∪CG4o. In set CG1o,
there are three atomic service providers: asp1,asp2 and asp3 which can provide atomic
service, AS1. From the viewpoint of a composite service provider, the existence of multi-
ple candidates makes it necessary to develop a strategy that decides which atomic service
provider should be selected for a given type of atomic service. This is the main objective
5Figure 1.4 Composite service provider and its controlled group
of the service composition protocol and has been extensively studied from various per-
spectives [5][6]. From the point of view of an atomic service provider, the existence of
other agents sharing the same functionality constitutes a potential competition, which
asks more strategic decision capabilities if it intends to generate proﬁt from the service
provisioning process.
1.2 Management Issues for Service Market
Figure.1.5 displays the conceptual diagram of the management architecture for a
service market. A set of functional components are connected through the information
ﬂow channel.
• A large amount of atomic service providers register their proﬁles in the market.
These proﬁles are stored in the service registry and provide service attributes
as the inputs for the service composition protocol. Once the number of stored
service proﬁles increases, the related indexing and discovery tasks can become
quite challenging. In [7], we develop a hierarchical service structuring approach
based on pattern recognition techniques. In [8], we design the counting Bloom
ﬁlter-based service storage architecture and develop multi-level service discovery
protocol based on this architecture.
6Figure 1.5 Management architecture of service market
• The module of Service proﬁle processor extracts various types of information from
the input service proﬁle, and perform necessary operations before storing a service
proﬁle in the registry. For instance, in order to use the numerical-based pattern
recognition algorithms, the service proﬁles have to be quantized before a clustering
algorithm can be applied.
• The Service composition module is embedded with a set of optimization algorithms
to discover and aggregate several services into the target business process. The
service proﬁle parameters stored in the service registry are used as the inputs
for the optimization algorithms. In the service market, the service composition
process aﬀects the business interests of multiple service agents at diﬀerent levels.
For instance, the composite service provider focuses on the end-to-end performance
of the whole business process while an atomic service provider tends to maximize
its own interest. One of the challenges of these optimization algorithms is to
balance the business interests of diﬀerent service agents in accordance with a set
of pre-determined objectives [5].
71.3 Structure the Competitive Service Market From the
Perspective of Supply-and-Demand Relationship
In the competitive service market, atomic service providers are the upper stream
services suppliers who manage the underlying service infrastructures and deliver the
services to the composite services providers in accordance with the pre-designed SLAs.
On the other hand, a composite services provider plays a twofold role:
• From the perspective of an outside service consumer, the composite service provider
behaves like a seller of composite service.
• From the viewpoint of atomic service provider selling services, the composite ser-
vice provider behaves like a purchaser of atomic service.
In the CSM setting, the above supply-and-demand relationships are delineated by the
following constraints in terms of the requirements analysis of the requested composite
service, e.g., S = {AS1, . . . , ASm}.
Functionality constraint : From the perspective of functional requirements, the func-
tionalities associated with every participating atomic service should have at least
one candidate service provider, which indicates that ‖CGio‖ > 0 ∀ ASi ∈ S ,
Where ‖ · ‖ represents the number of candidates.
Quality of service(QoS)-based constraint : In reality, every incoming service re-
quest is subject to certain QoS requirements along with several dimensions, such
as availability and the response time. These various QoS requirements are framed
as either global QoS constraints or local QoS constraints in terms of their respective
objectives. For instance, cspo is scheduled to deliver S illustrated in Figure. 1.3.
A local QoS constraint is that the availability for the participating atomic ser-
vice AS1 needs to be at least 90%; and a global constraint is that the end-to-end
response time should be less than 8 hours.
8Proﬁt-based constraint : In order to deliver the required service, the composite ser-
vice provider has to purchase atomic services from related service providers, which
naturally incurs costs. The budget of a service consumer, γ represents the upper
bound for the total cost of the composite service provider if it wants to gener-
ate some non-negative proﬁt from this service delivery process. This proﬁt-based
constraint is formulated as
j=m∑
j=1
Cjo,i ≤ γ ∃ aspi ∈ CGjo ∀ASj ∈ S . (1.1)
Cjo,i represents the transaction cost between composite service provider cspo and an
atomic service providers belonging to CGjo which is able to deliver the functionality
associated with ASj. If Equation.1.1 is not satisﬁed, then there does not exist
any economically feasible solution for the composite service provider to deliver the
service request S .
Among the three major constraints usually involved in the service composite process,
both QoS-based constraint and the proﬁt-based constraint are within the scope of non-
functional requirements. Mathematically, a service composition process can always be
framed as an optimization problem that has to satisfy these three constraints.
1.4 Research Challenges and Contributions
Managing the competitive service market not only involves a set of decision making
processes with diﬀerent objectives and instantiations, but also requires the construction
of the underlying service infrastructure to support the diverse business activities in the
market. Our research focuses on three fundamental issues of the service management,
which are listed as follows:
1. The decision making processes rely on quantitative models to help predict the
performance of various types of market players. In the competitive service market,
9the market players diﬀer in the position they hold in the market and their respective
system features. Moreover, these market players interact with each other through
various types of business relationships. How to capture these diﬀerences and their
interrelations in the modeling eﬀort is the ﬁrst issue we will address.
2. Each service provider can support multiple quality conﬁgurations for a single type
of service by controlling the performance of its service facility. This feature is
essential to gaining a competitive edge in the service market. Therefore, a service
provider tends to register every possible quality conﬁgurations in the service reg-
istry. As a consequence, a scalable storage space is required to store these service
parameter conﬁgurations and support the increased complexity of service discovery
process.
3. The business relationships between diﬀerent market players in the competitive
service market are framed through the service level agreement (SLA). A signed SLA
stipulates the service cost and service qualities, which are essential for searching,
delivering and monitoring the realized services. In the competitive service market,
the ever-changing business scenarios can aﬀect the framing process of the business
relationship, i.e., SLA design protocol. How to design SLAs in diﬀerent business
scenarios and understand the dynamic business relationships framed by diﬀerent
SLA design protocols is the third issue we will address.
The contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
1. We propose the concept of a competitive service market in order to capture the
business dynamics underlying the service systems. We characterize the service
chain in the market based on the formalized structural hierarchy and the con-
strained supply-and-demand relationship.
2. We systematically discuss the modeling issues of the service market.
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• In accordance with the hierarchical structure of the service market, we inves-
tigate the modeling approaches at both atomic service level and composite
service level, along with market level.
• We discuss the inﬂuences of heterogeneous time scales between the composite
service and atomic service on the calculation of end-to-end response time.
We develop an algorithm to solve this issue by capturing the time-dependent
behavior.
3. In accordance with the service requirements analysis, we classify the concept of ser-
vice and the concept of service parameter conﬁguration in terms of the functional
and non-functional features.
• In the context of the classiﬁcation of service and its service parameter conﬁg-
urations, we divide the service discovery process into a two-step procedure.
• Based on the chaining relationship connecting service, service parameter con-
ﬁguration and service provider, we develop a scalable storage architecture
consisting of a centralized service array and a set of decentralized storage
units using the entries in the service array as index.
• We apply counting Bloom ﬁlter to design storage unit and develop the related
service discovery process using the structural properties of counting Bloom
ﬁlter.
• We come up an analytically solvable metrics to predict the performance of
the service discovery process on this system.
4. The business relationship between diﬀerent market players are framed by SLAs.
• We identify several SLA design patterns in accordance with diﬀerent business
scenarios that can occur in the life cycle of the market.
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• We develop SLA design methodology with respect to each identiﬁed SLA
design pattern.
• We investigate the application of Bayes estimator in the bilateral negotiation-
based multi-attributes SLA design.
• We investigate the target-oriented SLA design in the sequential auction using
Bayes estimator.
• We build a Markov chain model to study the dynamic business relationships
framed by coexisting SLA design protocols. The constructed model will help
diﬀerent market players make both strategic and operational decisions.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
modeling approaches in accordance with the hierarchical structure of the competitive
service market. We not only address the modeling issues at the atomic service level
but also investigate how to model the market as a whole against a speciﬁc performance
metrics. In Chapter 3, we propose a scalable storage architecture design, and investigate
the associated service discovery protocol. In Chapter 4, we identify diﬀerent SLA design
patterns in terms of their respective business scenarios, and develop the corresponding
design methodologies. We conclude this dissertation with summary and future work in
Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2. A Systematic View of Service Market
2.1 Introduction
Within the competitive service market, each market player needs to make various
types of strategic and operational decisions. Strategic decisions tend to cover the long
and intermediate time horizon, such as the service infrastructure investment and the
placements of service resources. On the other hand, the operational decisions focus on
each single operation instance, such as the service selection and composition. Making
these decisions requires the modeling eﬀorts at both the localized level,i.e., atomic service
provider itself, and the global level, i.e., composite service provider spanning across
the enterprise boundaries. The constructed model and related performance analysis
guide the allocation, pricing and management of various types of service resources. The
ﬁrst part of this chapter presents a queuing modeling framework for the atomic service
provider. The introduction of queuing theory enables the quantitative analysis of a
variety of service parameters, which are usually used as the inputs to other modeling
problems. The second part of this chapter is going to discuss a modeling formulation at
the global level of the competitive service market. The contents of this chapter are the
extension of our previous work published in [9].
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2.2 Queuing Model for Atomic Service Provider
Atomic service provider performs as the building block for the service market, and the
stochastic modeling of which forms the basis for understanding the competitive service
market as a whole.
Figure 2.1 Queuing model of atomic service provider
Figure.2.1 illustrates a queuing model for an atomic service provider. The jobs will
accumulate in the wait queue once the arriving rate of incoming requests overwhelms the
service capacity. Interarrival times, service rate and buﬀer capacity are three essential
metrics to characterize a queue. In this research, the following assumptions are made.
• The interarrival times follows an exponential distribution.
• The service processing time does not ﬁt into any speciﬁc probabilistic models.
The statistical analysis against the historical record can provide the cumulative
distribution function.
• The system can have no more than K service requests at one time. In other words,
the capacity of the wait queue is K − 1.
A large portion of queuing-based studies tends to assume the Poisson distribution for
both service arriving and processing processes. Due to the heterogeneous service in-
frastructure, which can be hardware, software or even the human being, we relax the
service processing model to the general probability distributions. In terms of the queu-
ing modeling framework, this type of stochastic system can be modeled as a M/G/1/K
14
queue. From the perspective of theoretical study on the queuing modeling formalism,
more complicated queuing models can be created to allow higher degree of relaxations.
However, a large portion of these queuing models cannot be solved analytically and only
the numerical simulations are available for the investigation. In the following, we discuss
how some essential performance metrics can be derived based on the queuing model.
Response time is an essential metric that is required by the composite service provider
to plan the service composition process and estimate the system performance beforehand.
Moreover, response time also functions as a basic element for deriving other performance
metrics, e.g., reliability. The expected response time for the atomic service provider aspi
to deliver service ASj is denoted as T ij . The event density of aspi is characterized by
fηi(t), a probability density function to describe a random variable representing the
functioning time before the failure [10]. Hence, we have
Ri,j = 1−
∫ T ij
0
fηi(t) dt, (2.1)
where Ri,j represents the reliability for the service delivery process of aspi over service
ASj.
The system dynamics of the M/G/1/K queue is characterized by the number of
jobs staying in the system. Let Pi : i = 1, ..., K denote the probability with which an
admitted request sees i requests in the wait queue and service facility as a whole. PK
thus stands for the blocking probability. According to the queuing theory,
Pi =
μπi
λ + μπ0
i = 0, ..., K − 1 and PK = 1− Po
π0
(2.2)
In Equation.2.2, πi is the stationary probability distribution of the embedded Markov
chain underlying the M/G/1/K queuing system. Please refer to [11][12] for more details.
Here, we just want to stress the fact that Pi is analytically solvable and depends only on
the system parameters: λ, μ and K. Based on Eq.2.2, the expected number of requests
15
residing in the queue is calculated as
M =
K∑
i=0
iPi. (2.3)
According to the Little’s law [12], i.e., the average number of customers in the system
equals to the product of the average response time and the average eﬀective arrival rate.
Hence, the mean service response time for an atomic service provider can be computed
by
T = M
λ(1−PK) (2.4)
In Equation.2.4, (1−PK) is the admission probability and hence λ(1−PK) represents
the eﬀective arrival rate. Submitting the computed T into Equation.2.1 leads to the
queuing-based reliability metric. The analysis presented in this section is to provide
a building block for the further system analysis of the service market. Based on the
queuing framework, we can compute a variety of performance metrics which are used as
the input parameters for the decision making processes of diﬀerent market players.
2.3 Recursive Procedure for Computing End-to-End
Response Time in the Competitive Services Market
Instead of focusing on a single atomic service provider, in this section, we consider
the performance analysis at the composite service level, which is the calculation of the
end-to-end response time for a composite service. We generalize the studied model from
the trivial scenario of a single service provider to the scenario involving the existence of
multiple candidate service providers, and ﬁnally we take into account the time-dependent
behavior of the involved atomic service providers.
Algorithm.2.1 lists a recursive procedure for computing the end-to-end response time
for the composite service, like the one shown in Figure.2.2. T i denotes the response
time for service ASi. Since this algorithm does not consider the existence of multiple
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Algorithm 2.1 FTA1(ASi):Recursive procedure for calculating the response time for
a composite service
1: if N (ASi) = ∅ then
2: T i = Q(aspj);
3: else
4: T i = Q(aspj) + MAX(FTA1(ASj) : ∀ASj ∈ N (ASi));
5: end if
6: return T i;
candidates for a single service, we just assume that ASi is delivered by aspi and use
Q(aspi) to denote the expected service time computed from the queuing model of aspi.
N (ASi) represents the atomic service next to ASi in the business logic. For instance,
AS2 ∈ N (AS1) and AS3 ∈ N (AS1) in Figure.2.2.
Figure 2.2 An example for illustrating the computation procedure
The procedure is launched by calling the initialization service of the studied compos-
ite service. To compute the response time for the composite service shown in Figure.2.2,
we call FTA1(AS1). In accordance with the business logic shown in Figure.2.2,
FTA1(AS1) = T 1 = Q(asp1) + MAX(FTA1(AS2),FTA1(AS3)) (2.5)
And
FTA1(AS2) = Q(asp2) + FTA1(AS4)
FTA1(AS3) = Q(asp3) + MAX(FTA1(AS4),FTA1(AS5)) (2.6)
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Since no service node is next to the AS6,
FTA1(AS4) = Q(asp4) +Q(asp6)
FTA1(AS5) = Q(asp5) +Q(asp6) (2.7)
The results given by Equation.2.7 will be returned back to Equation.2.6 and ﬁnally
to Equation.2.5 to get FTA1(AS1) = T 1 according to the invoking sequence in this
recursive procedure.
The setting of competitive service market allows the existence of multiple atomic
service provider candidates for a single service. The procedure of FTA1 does not consider
this kind of possibility. Therefore, we design a reﬁned procedure identiﬁed as FTA2.
Algorithm 2.2 FTA2(ASi):Recursive procedure for calculating the composite service
response time in the services market
1: if N (ASi) = ∅ then
2: T i = MIN(Q(aspj) : ∀aspj ∈ CGio);
3: else
4: T i = MIN(Q(aspj) : ∀aspj ∈ CGio) + MAX(FTA2(ASj) : ∀ASj ∈ N (ASi));
5: end if
6: return T i;
Algorithm.2.2 diﬀers with Algorithm.2.1 at lines 2 and 4, where the former has to take
into account the existence of multiple candidates. Both FTA1(ASi) and FTA2(ASi) as-
sume that performance metrics of the atomic service provider aspi does not vary with
time. In practice, the life cycle of a composite service and the one of an atomic service
may have diﬀerent time scales. Consider the example shown in Figure.2.3, AS1 and AS2
can take multiple days, and AS4 only needs multiple minutes for fulﬁlling its function-
ality. This is a system consisting of components which diﬀer in their time scales. If the
atomic service providers available for delivering AS4 are un-stationary systems whose
performance metrics are generally time-dependent functions, the diﬀerence between the
starting time of the composite service and the starting time of AS4 should be tracked
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in order to compute the end-to-end response time by using the accurate response time
of AS4, which depends on when AS4 will be invoked.
Figure 2.3 An example illustrating the time diﬀerence
A reﬁned end-to-end response time computation procedure is listed in Algorithm.2.3.
Algorithm 2.3 FTA3(ASi, t):Recursive procedure for calculating the composite service
response time considering queuing factor
1: if N (ASi) = ∅ then
2: T i = MIN(QT(aspj, t) : ∀aspj ∈ CGio);
3: else
4: t1 = MIN(QT(aspj, t) : ∀aspj ∈ CGio);
5: T i = t + t1 + MAX(FTA3(ASj, t + t1) : ∀ASj ∈ N (ASi));
6: end if
7: return T i;
Following similar procedures, the end-to-end response time for a given composite
service can be calculated by calling FTA3(AS1, 0), where AS1 is the initialization service
node and thus the elapsed time to AS1 is 0. FTA3(ASi, t) diﬀers with FTA1(ASi) and
FTA2(ASi) in terms of the following two points:
• The service time computation procedure, invoked at line 2, is identiﬁed as QT,
which takes two parameters, aspi and t. t is the elapsed time inherited from
the recursive call at line 5. Based on this information, each aspi can track the
elapsed time between the starting time of the composite service and the starting
time of this speciﬁc atomic service to be delivered by itself in accordance with the
business logic. Therefore, more accurate service information, such as the blocking
probability or service time, can be supplied to the composite service provider to
help the service selection process. On the other hand, FTA1(ASi) and FTA2(ASi)
do not consider this type of time information.
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• The recursive call at line 5 monitors the elapsed time from the initialization point
to its ﬁnishing point. The resulting sum, t + t1 is used as the parameter of the
recursive call for the next service node in the business logic.
Starting from a trivial procedure of computing the end-to-end response time for compos-
ite service, we step-by-step reﬁne this procedure by taking into account two important
factors in the practical competitive service market modeling: multiple candidates for a
single atomic service and the time-dependent behavior of the atomic service providers.
2.4 Market-based Availability Modeling
Section 2.2 focuses on the system performance modeling at the atomic service level,
and section 2.3 considers an important performance metrics at the composite service
level. In this section, we are going to discuss the stochastic analysis of a performance
metrics at the market level using Markov chain which is a random process well suited
to model the stochastic systems.
2.4.1 Discrete-Time Markov Chains
Markov chain is a particular type of random process, and is characterized by the
memoryless property, i.e., the state in the future only depends on the current state [13].
The Markov chain is represented as {X(t), t ∈ T}, where X(t) is a numerical value, and
its domain is referred to as the state space. In the Markov chain theory, the state space
is always discrete. T is the parameter space and it can be either discrete or continuous.
In the discrete parameter space, t is usually called as step. In the continuous parameter
space, t is usually called as time. A Markov chain with discrete parameter space is
referred to as discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC). The DTMC dynamics is controlled
by the one-step transition probability Pt[i, j]. It stands for the probability of reaching
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state j from i in one step and is given in Equation.2.8.
Pt[i, j] = Pr{X(t + 1) = j|X(t) = i} (2.8)
The value of Pt[i, j] is controlled by three factors: t, i and j. The homogeneous DTMC
removes the eﬀect of t, which is
Pt1 = Pt2 ∀ t1 ∈ T and t2 ∈ T (2.9)
For the homogeneous Markov chain, we can just remove t from the transition prob-
ability for simplicity. Figure.2.4 shows a DTMC example composed of nine states,
{A,B,C,D,E, F,G,H, I}. The value associated with each transition represents the
one-step transition probability.
Figure 2.4 A discrete-time Markov chain
With respect to the DTMC shown in Figure.2.4, we number the states {A,B,C,D,E,
F,G,H, I} as {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} respectively. The corresponding matrix representa-
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tion is given in the following.
P =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0.4 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0
0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The Markov chain dynamics at each step can be captured by a probability vector:
Pt = [Pt[1], ..., Pt[m]] and Pt[i] = Pr{X(t) = i} (2.10)
In the above equation, m represents the number of states in the Markov chain model. The
initial probability vector P0 at step 0 describes the system dynamics at the very begin-
ning, which is usually given as an assumption by the system modeler. The combination
of initial probability vector and the probability transition matrix uniquely determines
the probability vector Pt for every t [14]. This relationship is implemented through a
series of matrix multiplication.
Pt = Pt−1 ×P =⇒ Pt = (Pt−2 ×P)×P =⇒ Pt = P0 ×Pt (2.11)
2.4.2 Market-Based Availability Modeling Using Markov Chains
Market-based availability is an important performance metrics for evaluating the
service market as a whole. With respect to a request,S = {AS1, . . . , ASi, . . . , ASn},
its market-based availability is measured as the probability for the request service to be
able to be fulﬁlled by at least one composite service provider in the market.
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Figure 2.5 A requested composite service with sequential pattern
Figure 2.5 shows a composite service example of S = {AS1, AS2, AS3}, which has
a sequential workﬂow pattern. With respect to this service request, we are going to
compute the availability for a market consisting of two composite service providers:
csp1 and csp2.
We model the system dynamics by deﬁning the state as A = “a1a2a3”. a1 represents
the atomic service that is being processed and it can have value 1, 2 or 3. a2 represents
whether csp1 is able to deliver service Sa1 from its controlled atomic service providers.
If csp1 is able to fulﬁll the task, than a2 = 1; otherwise, a2 = 0. Similarly, a3 represent
whether csp2 is able to deliver service ASa1 from its controlled atomic service providers.
For instance, state 100 represents that both csp1 and csp2 fail to fulﬁll AS1 from their
respective controlled atomic service providers; state 311 indicates that both csp1 and
csp2 can fulﬁll AS3.
Figure.2.6 displays the constructed Markov chain model consisting of 12 states:{100,
101, 110, 111, 200, 201, 210, 211, 300, 301, 310, 311}. The constructed Markov model has
a layered topological structure which has following features:
• State i01 can only reach the states (i + 1)01 and (i + 1)00;
• State i10 can only reach the states (i + 1)10 and (i + 1)00;
• State i11 can reach all of the states in the next layer which is composed of the
states represented as (i + 1)a2a3.
Forming this type of layered topological structure comes from the following facts:
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Figure 2.6 The Markov chain model of the market-level availability for ser-
vice request S = {AS1, AS2, AS3}
• If a composite service provider fails to fulﬁll the i-th atomic service, then it is
meaningless for it to fulﬁll the (i+1)-th atomic service.
• If a composite service provider successfully ﬁnishes the i-th atomic service, it can
either successfully fulﬁll or fail to deliver the (i+1)-th atomic service.
After ﬁxing the topological structure of a Markov chain model, we still need to obtain
its one-step transition probabilities which are obtained by analyzing the probabilistic
behaviors of the studied system.
The fact that state (i+1)01 is reachable from state i01 indicates that csp2 can deliver
the service ASi+1. LetPr
f (CGi+12 ) denotes the probability that none of the atomic service
providers belonging to CGi+12 is available to serve ASi+1. In chapter 1, CGi+12 stands for
the set of atomic service providers controlled by csp2 for providing ASi+1. Pr
f (CGi+12 )
can be calculated as follows.
Prf (CGji ) =
∏
Prf (aspl) ∀aspl ∈ CGji (2.12)
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In Equation.2.12, Prf (aspl) denotes the probability of failure for aspl. Hence, we have
P[i01, (i + 1)01)] = 1−Prf (CGi+12 ). (2.13)
From Equation.2.13, the transition probability of P[i01, (i + 1)00)] is computed as
P[i01, (i + 1)00)] = 1−P[i01, (i + 1)01)] = Prf (CGi+12 ) (2.14)
Similarly, we have
P[i10, (i + 1)10)] = 1−Prf (CGi+11 ) (2.15)
P[i10, (i + 1)00)] = Prf (CGi+11 ) (2.16)
The fact that state (i+1)11 is reachable indicates that at least one of the atomic service
providers in CGi+11 and at least one of the atomic service providers in CGi+12 are able to
serve ASi+1. Therefore,
P(i11, (i + 1)11) = (1−Prf (CGi+11 ))(1−Prf (CGi+12 )) (2.17)
The fact that (i+1)00 is reachable indicates that none of the atomic service providers in
CGi+11 and none of the atomic service providers in CGi+12 is able to serve ASi+1. Therefore,
P(i11, (i + 1)00) = Prf (CGi+11 )Prf (CGi+12 ) (2.18)
The similar analysis leads to the other remaining transition probabilities:
P(i11, (i + 1)01) = Prf (CGi+11 )(1−Prf (CGi+12 )) (2.19)
P(i11, (i + 1)10) = (1−Prf (CGi+11 ))Prf (CGi+12 ) (2.20)
Among the twelve states shown in Figure.2.6, states {100, 200, 300, 301, 310, 311} are
absorbing states. Once reaching an absorbing state, the system will not leave. With
respect to these six absorbing states, the states {100, 200, 300} represent the scenarios
where the market fail to meet the request of S = {AS1, AS2, AS3}; and the states
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{301, 310, 311} represent the scenarios where the market is able to meet the request
of S = {AS1, AS2, AS3}. The Markov chain model shown in Figure.2.6 belongs to a
special type of Markov chain, which is called as absorbing Markov chain [13]. We use
π[i, j] to denote the probability of being absorbed in an absorbing state j once starting
from the transient state j.
φ = πa(“301”) + πa(“310”) + πa(“311”) (2.21)
In Equation.2.21, φ represents the market-based availability; πa(“301”), πa(“310”) and
πa(“311”) represent the aggregation absorption probability for states “301”, “310” and
“311” respectively. Their computations are given as follows:
πa(“301”) = π(“101”, “301”)P0[“101”] + π(“110”, “301”)P0[“110”]
+π(“111”, “301”)P0[“111”] + π(“100”, “301”)P0[“100”]
(2.22)
In Equation.2.22, π(“101”, “301”) represents the absorption probability of state “301”
given a start state of “101”. P0[“101”] represents the initial probability of state “101”,
which is an input parameter given by the system modeler. For the Markov chain model
shown in Figure.2.6, only states “101”, “110”“111” and “101” can have nonzero val-
ues in the initial probability vector. This is why we only consider four starting states
in Equation.2.22. The computation of π(“101”, “301”) can use the standard proce-
dures based on fundamental matrix [15]. The physical meanings for other terms in
Equation.2.22 and the computation of πa(“310”) and πa(“311”) are similar.
2.5 Summary and Discussion
Competitive service market is proposed to study the interactions and competitive
natures among customers, atomic service providers and composite service providers. The
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research reported in this chapter aims to understand this relationship from the system
analysis perspective. We structure our modeling eﬀorts at two levels in accordance
with the inherent hierarchy in the service market, which has the atomic service at the
bottom level and the composite service at the upper level. We investigate diﬀerent
modeling approaches for each level. The queuing modeling at the atomic service level
functions as the building block for other analyses, while the market-based availability
analysis using DTMC provides an illustrative yet operational example for the stochastic
analysis at the market level. Performing this availability analysis aims to illustrate how
a generic service system is modeled and analyzed. Detailed probabilistic analysis has
been made to construct the transition matrix for the Markov chain model. Based on the
constructed Markov chain, we investigate how a performance metric, like availability,
can be analyzed over the service market. In practice, the concrete Markov model varies
with the studied system and the requested service. We can project that the size of
the state space can become quite large when the composite service involves a lot of
atomic services. The next step research along with this direction is to investigate the
applications of high-level modeling formalisms on the performance analysis of service
market [16]. The end-to-end response time computation procedure demonstrates how
the inherent complexities in the composite service can be taken into account. Modeling
the time-dependent behavior for a service system represents another challenge that has
to be meet in our future research [17].
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CHAPTER 3. A Scalable Storage Architecture to Support
Service Storage and Service Discovery
In the service market, a centralized service registry maintains a record for each reg-
istered service, which contains various types of pertinent information such as the corre-
sponding service provider and QoS attributes. Such information enables the published
service to be able to be discovered and invoked by a service composition protocol. How-
ever, the proliferation of services and their diverse realizations require the service registry
to be able to store a large amount of service-related information. The related service
discovery process also becomes a challenging task due to the existence of many candi-
dates for a single service request. These issue has not been fully explored in the current
service registry design [18][19]. In our previous work [7], we characterize the services
through quantiﬁable features, and classify services into separate clusters based on pat-
tern recognition algorithms [20]. This service clustering approach leads to a hierarchical
service management scheme to support the large scale service solution design. Based
on feature-based service characterization, we can encode both the registered services
and incoming service requests as bit strings, and thus transform the service discovery
problem into the string matching problem. This transformation enables us to use well-
established algorithms in this ﬁeld [21][22]. Furthermore, we propose a service storage
architecture based on eﬃcient yet widely-applicable data structures to support the stor-
age and service discovery process. The main contents of this chapter have been published
in [8].
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3.1 Quantifying Services With Features
Each service is characterized by a collection of features with a wide range of attributes
spanning from business oriented ones to system centric ones. These features belong to
two basic categories:
Functional features: these features are used to describe the basic functionalities of
the related service, e.g., shipping service;
Non-functional features: these features are related to a variety of constraints that
have to be satisﬁed while meeting the functional requirements.
Based on the practical service design experiences, we tend to take into account the
following service features which usually play critical roles in characterizing services [23].
Service availability quantiﬁes the probability of being able to serve a request by one
or more service providers.
Service cost represents the price tag that is asked by the service provider for delivering
the related service. It usually is equivalent to the sum of the operation cost of
rendering the service and the net proﬁt expected by the service provider.
Service interface deﬁnes the gateway for communicating with service consumers and
other service providers, it stipulates the rules for the service functionality to be
explored.
Service reliability measures the ability of a service provider to satisfactorily deliver
service in compliance with the enlisted functional and non-functional requirements
in a given time period.
Service response time is computed as the elapsed time between the time point of
receiving a service request and the time point of fulﬁlling the service functionality.
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Service security evaluates how the privacy of various participants are protected during
the life cycle of the service provisioning process.
Every selected feature is assigned with a numerical range over which we can score a
particular service. In the following example, we quantify the response time (T ) in the
scale of “1-5”. A service with smaller response time is assigned a higher score.
Table 3.1 Quantiﬁcation procedure of service response time (T )
Quantitative range of T T score
T ≤ 25s 5
25s < T ≤ 50s 4
50s < T ≤ 75s 3
75s < T ≤ 100s 2
T > 100s 1
Based on the binary notation scheme,the numerically scored service feature can be
represented as a bit string. For instance, the l-th feature of ASi,j, an atomic service of
identity j and delivered by atomic service provider aspi, is the service response time and
gets a numerical score of 5 in the above quantiﬁcation procedure. It is thus encoded as
a binary bit string of 0101. Hereafter, we use bsi,jl to denote the bit string corresponding
to the l-th feature of ASi,j. By considering all of the related features, the service is also
represented as a bit string, the congregation of a collection of bit strings, each of which
corresponds to a single feature.
ASi,j ↔ bsi,j1 . . . bsi,jl . . . bsi,jn (3.1)
In Equation.3.1, the whole string bsi,j1 . . . bs
i,j
l . . . bs
i,j
n is referred to as a service param-
eter conﬁguration, which encodes every related performance metrics for service ASi,j.
Every realizable service parameter conﬁguration is published to the service registry as a
candidate for the service discovery process.
This feature-based bit string representation scheme works not only for the registry
services, but also for the service requests. The customers’ various requirements are rep-
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resented as the target score for the corresponding features used to characterize services.
The service discovery process is hereby transformed into a classical string matching prob-
lem which has been studied extensively [22]. The string matching-based service discovery
solution requires comparing every candidate service against the request. Accordingly,
the total computational cost depends on both the number of comparison operations and
the performance of each string matching operation. The algorithm design for the string
matching problem is beyond the research scope of this thesis. Our research focuses on
the storage architecture design for the service registry that can reduce the number of
comparison operations.
3.2 Feature-guided Architecture Design
In the competitive service market, the number of services in terms of oﬀered func-
tionalities are limited. However,the number of potential service realizations in terms of
their respective service parameter conﬁgurations can be very large. This is a reasonable
hypothesis because a service provider is able to provide the same type of service with dif-
ferent parameter conﬁgurations. For instance, a server can serve requests with diﬀerent
response time values. Consider a service characterized by 6 features, and each feature is
scored on a scale of “1-5”. Potentially, there exist 56 service parameter conﬁgurations
for this single service. Formally, we use φ = {AS1, . . . , ASm} to denote the set of atomic
services in a competitive service market. With respect to service ASi, the set of its
corresponding service parameter conﬁgurations is referred to as a service group and is
denoted as Si. The union of Si, i.e., ∪i=mi=1 Si, is denoted as G.
In a storage architecture, φ and G are stored separately, and the storage requirement
for φ is less demanding than the one for G. The mapping relationship between ASi ∈ φ
and Si ⊆ G suggests that the former can be used to index the latter. In the storage
architecture design, keeping track of the mapping relationship between service and the
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corresponding service group aims to support the service discovery process, which will be
discussed later. Our design is a hybrid storage architecture (HSA) that is able to store
both φ and G while supporting an eﬃcient service discovery process. HSA, illustrated
in Figure 3.1, is composed of an service array used to store the set φ, and a collection
of storage units used to store the set G.
Figure 3.1 Hybrid storage architecture for service registry
Due to the limited number of services, the service array is based on the normal data
structure,like array. The i-th entry of the service array stores the identity of a service,
e.g., ASi, and maintains a pointer to the storage unit i, which stores the service group Si.
Since the size of a storage unit is usually very large due to the combinatorial parameter
conﬁgurations, the focus of this section centers around the design of these storage units.
In our research, we propose to use counting Bloom ﬁlter, a probabilistic data structure,
to build the storage unit.
3.2.1 Standard Bloom Filters and Counting Bloom Filters
A standard Bloom ﬁlter (BF) is a hashing-based data structure representing a set
of elements [24]. Compared to the hash table, BF can reduce the space requirement
further and allows using simpler hash functions, which saves computational cost for
lookup-intensive operations [25]. A BF is composed of a bit array denoted as B and
g independent hash functions Fh = {h1( ), . . . , hg( )}. The bit array B is of length q
and is initialized as 0 for all of the entries. Each hash function maps an element in
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A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} to an array entry. Hereafter, we use BFA to denote the BF for set
A, and use BA to denote the related bit array. Algorithm 3.1 lists the procedures of
constructing a Bloom ﬁlter representing a given set, and Figure 3.2 shows the constructed
BFA for set A.
Algorithm 3.1 Constructing Bloom ﬁlter for set A(‖A‖ = n)
1: for i = 0 to q do
2: BA[i] = 0;
3: end for
4: for i = 0 to n do
5: for j = 0 to g do
6: p = hj(ai);
7: if BA[p] = 0 then
8: BA[p] = 1;
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
Figure 3.2 A Bloom ﬁlter example
A BF has two structural properties resulting from its construction scheme.
Property 1 : If a ∈ A, then the construction process should mark every hashed po-
sition in the bit array with 1. Hence, for a given query a, if any of the hashed
positions in BA for a is found to be 0, then a /∈ A.
Property 2 : Given a query a /∈ A, it is possible to ﬁnd that every hashed position of
a having been marked with 1 in BA.
Given an element a and a set A, determining whether a ∈ A is referred to as set
membership evaluation which is used in a lot of applications [26]. A trivial approach
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for the set membership evaluation is to compare each element belonging to A with a
until we ﬁnd a match, which involves a computational complexity of O(‖A‖), where
‖A‖ represents the size of set A. Instead of comparing each element of A with a, the
BF-based set membership evaluation computes every hashed position of a and checks
whether it has been marked with 1. According to Property 1, an all negative answer
can be used to remove the possibility of a ∈ A with certainty. On the other hand,
implied by Property 2, an all positive answer cannot ensure that a ∈ A due to the
possible overlaps in the hashed positions among diﬀerent elements belonging to A. This
issue is known as false positive yielded by BF-based set membership evaluation [25]. The
false positive probability will decrease exponentially when g increases, which makes the
inﬂuences of false positives negligible in real applications [27].
The overlaps in the hashed positions among diﬀerent elements make it unable to
support BF-based deleting operation on a set. For instance, deleting ai from A requires
the BF to reset every hashed position BA[hl(ai)] : ∀l = 1, . . . , g to zero. If hl(aj) =
1 for j = i, then the deleting operation of ai will aﬀect the associated hashed position
of another element aj. This will result in an incorrect BF representation for aj, whose
g hashed positions should always be marked as “1”. To address this issue, counting
Bloom ﬁlter (CBF), an extension of the BF, is developed by setting the entry attribute
as a counter value rather than a bit as in BF [28]. During the construction of a CBF,
every hashed position for an element is increased by “1” rather than marked as “1”. A
counterpart of Figure 3.2 is shown in Figure 3.3, which illustrates the CBF representation
for set A. The value of each array entry equals the number of input arcs, i.e., the number
of elements hashed into this entry. Besides the capability of supporting the deleting
operation, the introduction of counter values also enables the CBF to keep track of
the number of elements having been hashed into a given position. This property will be
used in the latter for the CBF-based storage unit design. The set membership evaluation
based on a CBF is similar to the BF: if any of the g hashed position of query a is found
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to be 0 in BA, then a /∈ A.
Figure 3.3 A counting Bloom ﬁlter example
3.2.2 Storage Unit Design Using Counting Bloom Filters
In this section, we will discuss the storage unit design for the service groups. Each
unit stores a service group for a given service, and consists of two parts: CBF-based
counter value array and a collection of linked lists. Each linked list is indexed by an
array entry of CBF. Compared to the normal CBF, each entry not only stores the counter
value, but also contains a pointer to the associated linked list. This storage design is
based on the concept proposed in [29], which is referred to as pruned fast Hash table
in the original paper. The major structural property of this design is the placement
of element: with respect to an element and the set of corresponding hashed positions,
the element is stored in the linked list whose length is the smallest according to the
counter values of these hashed positions. In order to fulﬁll the functionality of service
discovery, the HSA needs to keep track of the chaining relationships connecting service,
service parameter conﬁguration, and service provider. This motivates our extension of
the classical CBF conﬁguration: as shown in Figure. 3.4, each node in the attached list
stores the bit string representing a service parameter conﬁguration and its associated
service provider. Figure. 3.4 uses the storage unit structure for service group S1 as an
illustrative example.
S1 is composed of four service parameter conﬁgurations, which are denoted as AS11 ,
AS12 , AS
1
3 and AS
1
4 respectively. AS
1
2 is provided by SP3, AS
1
3 is provided by SP1. SP2
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Figure 3.4 CBF-based storage unit for service group S1
is able to deliver two diﬀerent service parameter conﬁgurations, AS11 and AS
1
4 . Here,
with respect to ASij, the superscript i is used to identify the service and corresponding
service group; the subscript j denotes the j-th service parameter conﬁguration for this
service. SPj stands for the j-th atomic service provider being able to deliver the service
ASi corresponding to Si. Note that we use aspl to represent the l-th atomic service
provider in Chapter 1 and 2, where l works as a global index. Here, the subscript l of
SPl can be thought of as a local index within the scope of Si. To avoid the confusion,
we also use SP rather than asp here. In the example, there are three hashed positions
for AS13 , which are 3, 7 and 10. The associated counter values are B[3] = 2,B[7] = 3
and B[10] = 2 respectively. The smallest counter value among the hashed positions of
AS13 is B[3], and thus the element is placed in the linked list pointed by B[3]. Note that
the counter value stored in an array entry does not necessarily reﬂect the true length
of its attached linked list. For instance, B[5] = 3, but its attached linked list is empty.
Algorithm 3.2 illustrates the operation of inserting a service instance into the storage
unit for its corresponding service group.
In Algorithm 3.2, i is the identity of the target storage unit for the service group Si
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Algorithm 3.2 insertCBF(Si, ASij): Inserting a service parameter conﬁguration into
the CBF-based storage unit
1: Initialize D as a zero array of size gi;
2: for y = 1 to gi do
3: D[y] = hiy(AS
i
j);
4: Bi[D[y]] = Bi[p[y]] + 1;
5: end for
6: m = argmin(Bi[D[y]]), ∀y = 1, . . . , gi;
7: Attach a node consisting of ASij and SP (AS
i
j) to listm of BF
i;
corresponding to ASi. The CBFs corresponding to diﬀerent service groups are heteroge-
neous in their respective parameter settings. Hence, we use gi to represent the number
of hash functions used by BF i and hiy to represent its y-th hash function. The operation
of line 6 is to locate the linked list with the smallest counter value among gi hashed
positions for service parameter conﬁguration ASij. At line 7, listm represents the linked
list pointed by the m-th array entry, and SP (ASij) stands for the service provider for
ASij, which also needs to be stored. Algorithm 3.3 lists the HSA-based service discovery
protocol. In accordance with the service requirements analysis, the service discovery
protocol can be separated into two steps. First, the service discovery process needs to
ﬁnd the service that can fulﬁll the functional requirements; secondly, the service discov-
ery process needs to pinpoint the candidate service parameter conﬁguration which can
fulﬁll the non-functional requirements aﬃliated with this service request. Therefore, the
HSA-based service discovery process is separated into two stages:
1. Determine the storage unit for the service group that can fulﬁll the functional
requirements of a service request.
2. Discover the service parameter conﬁguration that can fulﬁll the non-functional
requirements of a service request from the storage unit obtained in the ﬁrst stage.
In Algorithm 3.3, RSf denotes the service request represented by its functional re-
quirements. RSnf denotes the bit string representing the non-functional requirements
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Algorithm 3.3 hsaServiceDiscovery(RSf , RSnf ): HSA-based service discovery
1: i = FindIndex(RSf );
2: if i = null then
3: print “There is no match to the service request in terms of the functional re-
quirement.”
4: return
5: else
6: Initialize D as a zero array of size gi;
7: for y = 1 to gi do
8: D[i] = hiy(RSnf );
9: end for
10: m = argmin(Bi[D[y]]),∀y = 1, . . . , gi;
11: if D[m] = 0 then
12: print “There is no match to the service request in terms of the non-functional
requirements.”
13: return
14: else
15: d← LinkedListSearch(listm, RSnf );
16: if d = null then
17: print “d.sp is the service provider.”
18: return
19: else
20: print “There is no match to the service request in terms of the non-functional
requirements.”
21: return
22: end if
23: end if
24: end if
of the service request. The operations listed between line 1 and line 5 belong to the ﬁrst
stage of the HSA-based service discovery protocol. As we discussed above, the i-th entry
of the service array stores the identity of a service. The operation of FindIndex iterates
over the service array and returns the service identity that can satisfy the functional re-
quirement of the request. A returned null value of i indicates that there does not have a
service group being able to meet the functional requirements of the request. The array
of D stores the hashed positions for the request. In accordance with the set membership
evaluation criterion of CBF, we check whether RSnf can ﬁnd a match in the service
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group based on the smallest counter values in array D. These are the operations listed
at lines 10 and 11. A positive answer indicates that it is possible to have a candidate
service parameter conﬁguration matching the request. This operation is a fast lookup
without 100% guarantee due to the false positives of CBF. A nonzero value of D[m]
leads to the searching operation by traversing the associated linked list. Note that the
smallest element of D not only works for evaluating the element membership but also
helps selecting the linked list to be searched. LinkedListSearch represents a standard
searching operation over a linked list [26]. The returned node is denoted as d, and d.sp
stands for the service provider identity stored in d. A returned null node indicates that
there is no match to the request and the original positive feedback is caused by false
positives.
Algorithm 3.3 is composed of three major operations: (1) the operation of FindIn-
dex determines the particular service for fulﬁlling the requested functional requirement,
the computational cost of which depends on the number of registered services; (2) the
operations at lines 6−10 perform the set membership evaluation and chooses the linked
list to be searched, the computational cost of which depends on the number of hash
functions, i.e., gi; (3) the computational cost of searching operation of LinkedList-
Search depends on the length of the linked list bounded by Bi[D[y]]. Among these
three operations, LinkedListSearch contributes the most to the total computational
cost because neither the number of registered services nor the number of hash functions
will be a big value.
3.2.3 Performance Analysis of the HSA-based Service Discovery Process
As discussed previously, the bit string-based service discovery process requires com-
paring a service request with every candidate service parameter conﬁguration. The
performance of this type of service discovery process is aﬀected by two factors: the
computational cost of each string matching operation and the number of comparison
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operations. Our design motivation is to reduce the number of these comparison oper-
ations. The focus of this section is to quantitatively analyze the performance of the
HSA-based service discovery process in terms of the expected number of comparison
operations.
An inherent structural feature of the CBF-based storage unit is to distribute the
candidate service parameter conﬁgurations into a set of linked lists. Moreover, the con-
struction of each linked list is guided by the counter value stored in the array. Therefore,
the second stage of the HSA-based service discovery process, which consists of a number
of comparison operations, is conducted over these distributed linked lists. Let Cd denote
the number of comparison operations required for the CBF-based storage unit design,
then we have
E[Cd] = 0.5× Ld
2
+ 0.5× γ × Ld = (0.25 + 0.5γ)Ld (3.2)
In Equation.3.2, Ld represents the expected length of the linked list for the CBF-based
storage unit design and γ represents the false positive probability for the CBF-based set
membership evaluation. With respect to a given service request, we assume that the
probability of being able to ﬁnd a match is 0.5. If a request does not have a match in
the set of the candidate service parameter conﬁgurations, the CBF-based set member-
ship evaluation should be able to block the request at the very beginning without even
initializing the search operation on the linked list. However, due to the false positives of
the CBF, a search operation which is certainly to fail may still be launched. This failed
operation cannot ﬁnd match after traversing the whole linked list. If a request does
have a match in the set of the candidate service parameter conﬁgurations, an average
Ld/2 comparison operations have to be performed. This is due to the assumption that
the position of that particular match in the linked list follows the uniform distribution.
This analysis leads to Equation.3.2. On the other hand, without the help of CBF-guided
distributed architecture design, a normal storage unit design puts all of the candidate
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service parameter conﬁgurations in a single linked list. Let Cn denote the number of
comparison operations required for the normal storage unit design, then we have
E[Cn] = 0.5× n
2
+ 0.5× n = 0.75n (3.3)
The analysis for the normal storage unit design is similar to the above. Here, the length of
the linked list is n, the number of candidate service parameter conﬁgurations. Moreover,
without the help of the CBF-based set membership evaluation, all of the requests which
do not have a match in the set of the candidate service parameter conﬁgurations, have
to traverse the whole linked list before being able to ﬁnd that there does not exist a
match. Equation.3.2 diﬀers with Equation.3.3 on two parts: Ld versus n; and 0.5γ
versus 0.5. The ﬁrst part comes from the fact that the CBF-based storage unit provides
a distributed structure. The second part comes from the CBF-based set membership
evaluation. Both parts contribute to make E[Cd] being smaller than E[Cn].
3.2.4 An Analytical Performance Metrics to Evaluate the HSA-based Ser-
vice Discovery Process
In the above, we discuss the diﬀerence between E[Cd] and E[Cn], which directly de-
pends on the expected length of the linked list to be searched, Ld. However, this variable
cannot be analytically formulated and requires numerical simulation when adopting it to
evaluate the system performance. In this section, we will investigate an analytically solv-
able metrics, which can enable the system performance to be predicted without running
experimental simulations.
As shown in Algorithm 3.3, if every hashed position is discovered to be nonempty,
then we will search the linked list pointed by the entry whose counter value is the
smallest among all of the hashed positions. Accordingly, the number of comparison
operations invoked in our approach is bounded by the counter values. Hence, we use the
expected counter value as the evaluation metrics. In the following, we illustrate how to
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get an analytically solvable formula for the expected counter value based on probabilistic
analysis. Let V denote the counter value, we have
E[V ] = E[E[V |g˜ = i]]. (3.4)
Equation.3.4 computes E[V ] using iterated expectation. E[V |g˜ = i] represents the con-
ditional expectation of E[V ] when there have i diﬀerent hashed positions. It is computed
as ng/i. Here, n represents the number of candidate service parameter conﬁgurations.
We use g˜ to denote the number of diﬀerent hashed positions in order to diﬀerentiate it
with g, i.e., the number of hash functions to be used. Therefore, E[V ] is computed as
follows:
E[V ] = E[E[V |g˜ = i]]
=
g∑
i=1
E[V |g˜ = i]Pr(g˜ = i)
=
g∑
i=1
ng
i
Pr(g˜ = i) (3.5)
In Equation.3.5, Pr(g˜ = i) represents the probability that g hashed functions produce
i diﬀerent positions, which is computed in Equation.3.6.
Pr(g˜ = i) =
(
q
i
)∑i
a=0(−1)a
(
i
a
)
(i− a)g
qg
(3.6)
In Equation.3.6, the item of
(
q
i
)
represents the number of combinations of choosing i po-
sitions from q available entries; the item of
∑i
a=0(−1)a
(
i
a
)
(i− a)g represents the number
of permutations of putting g hashed results into i positions and none of these i posi-
tions is empty, which is derived based on the generating function for permutation [30];
the item of qg represents the number of combinations of g hashed positions. In [29],
Pr(g˜ = i) is derived based on the method of induction. In this research, we derive
Pr(g˜ = i) from a diﬀerent perspective and obtain a more compact analytical formula
shown in Equation.3.6. Substituting Equation.3.6 into Equation.3.5, we have
E[V ] =
g∑
i=1
ng
i
(
q
i
)∑i
a=0(−1)a
(
i
a
)
(i− a)g
qg
(3.7)
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Equation.3.7 indicates that E[V ] is a function of n and g which are the system parameters
of the CBF. Hence,E[V ] functions as an performance metrics that can be computed
beforehand and is well suited to predict the system performance. In the following, we
conduct a simulation-based experimental study to compare the expected counter value
with the expected length of the linked list, which is directly related to the number of
comparison operations.
3.2.5 Experimental Study
In this section, we will investigate the relationship between the expected counter
value and the expected length of the linked list to be searched. In the experiment, we
consider a variety of parameter settings for the CBF along with two diﬀerent numbers of
service parameter conﬁgurations. For illustration purposes, we report both the expected
counter value and the expected length of the linked list to be searched.
Table 3.2 20000 candidate service parameter conﬁgurations
Expected counter value
q = 90 q = 95 q = 100 q=105 q=110
g = 4 848 794 761 729 695
g = 6 1269 1211 1120 1099 1036
g = 8 1688 1603 1515 1427 1367
Expected length of the linked list to be traversed
q = 90 q = 95 q = 100 q=105 q=110
g = 4 493 459 442 438 431
g = 6 672 673 583 563 558
g = 8 887 851 804 806 740
Table.3.2 reports a case where there have 20000 candidate service parameter conﬁg-
urations. The upper part of the table reports the expected counter value computed by
Equation.3.7 for diﬀerent parameter settings. The lower part of the table reports the
expected length of the linked list to be searched. In Table.3.3, we report a case where
there have 40000 candidate service parameter conﬁgurations, and the applied parameter
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settings are the same as in Table.3.2.
Table 3.3 40000 candidate service parameter conﬁgurations
Expected counter value
q = 90 q = 95 q = 100 q=105 q=110
g = 4 1725 1598 1540 1471 1407
g = 6 2562 2449 2303 2204 2109
g = 8 3352 3229 3092 2867 2776
Expected length of the linked list to be traversed
q = 90 q = 95 q = 100 q=105 q=110
g = 4 997 968 842 873 825
g = 6 1343 1323 1285 1105 1064
g = 8 1707 1704 1653 1587 1437
As shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, the expected length of the linked list for
every system parameter setting is much smaller than n, i.e., Ld  n. This fact helps
supporting the claim that E[Cd] E[Cn]. The experimental results also show that every
expected length of the linked list is smaller than the corresponding expected counter
value. In some cases, the diﬀerence is large. Therefore, the expected counter value
should be treated as a conservative yet applicable approach to estimate the expected
length of the linked list to be searched, which directly controls the number of comparison
operations. Moreover, although the expected counter value is larger than the expect
length of the linked list, it is still smaller than n. Therefore, the analytical formula for
predicting the system performance, which is based on the expected counter value, keeps
track of the diﬀerence between the two storage designs in terms of the expected number
of comparison operations.
Based on the results reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, a larger size of counter
array for the CBF, i.e., q, reduces both the expected counter value and the expected
length of the linked list to be searched. This is due to the fact that a larger counter
array allows more linked lists to be built, which leads to a more distributed storage
conﬁguration. Although the total storage requirement is still the same, the expected
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number of comparison operations can be reduced accordingly. In practice, the counter
array of CBF can be maintained in a high-bandwidth and small on-chip memory [29].
This makes the computation of hash functions very fast, which enables the composite
service provider to block the request very quickly if it gets a negative answer from the
CBF-based set membership evaluation. This feature also helps the customer to decide
whether to modify the request or just quit the market in a very short time period, which
is a desirable characteristic in a competitive business environment. On the other hand,
the size of on-chip memory limits the size of counter array that we can use. Therefore,
it is not feasible to keep increasing the size of counter array for CBF without limitation.
The construction scheme of CBF results in the increments of the counter values
when we use more hash functions. This fact is reﬂected by the results shown in both
tables. Nevertheless, Bloom ﬁlter theory suggests that the false positive probability
decreases exponentially when we increase the number of hash functions. According to
Algorithm 3.3, the HSA-based service discovery protocol decides whether to block the
request based on the CBF-based set membership evaluation. A small false positive
probability is always desirable for this kind of functionality. Therefore, choosing the
number of hash functions should be treated as a design trade-oﬀ that balances diﬀerent
factors.
3.3 Summary and Discussion
From the perspective of service science and engineering, our contributions in this
chapter are threefold. First, after discussing our previous work on feature-based ser-
vice quantiﬁcation, we distinguish between the concept of service and the concept of
service parameter conﬁguration in terms of functional requirements and non-functional
requirements. Further, we design a hybrid storage architecture using counting Bloom
ﬁlter. Rather than focusing on the storage solution only, we also formalize the service
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discovery protocol based on the proposed architecture.
The proposed storage architecture still has several limitations that need to be lifted
in the future research. Regarding the HSA, the counter values and the associated linked
lists for each storage unit are conﬁgured during the CBF building process based on
the existing service group. If a service parameter conﬁguration is newly created and is
required to be added into the related storage unit, then the CBF and its related linked
lists may have to be rebuilt in order to allow the service discovery protocol perform
correctly. This rebuilding operation will cost a lot of computational resources if there
are frequent service insertions. An incremental insertion algorithm, proposed by Song
et.al [31], can be applied to support dynamic element insertion. Another approach
is to design storage unit based on dynamic Bloom ﬁlter, which supports the dynamic
set management and aims to control the false positive probability even the set size
increases [32].
In [7], we develop a pattern recognition-based service clustering scheme to organize
the services in a hierarchical structure to accelerate the service discovery process. This
technique can be used to reﬁne the HSA design. Instead of using a single CBF-based
storage unit to store the whole service group corresponding to a given service, we can
build a set of storage units with each of which storing a service cluster decomposed
from the service group. Hence, the service discovery process will be performed on a
smaller sized storage unit. This increased granularity can improve the performance of
service discovery by reducing the number of comparison operations further. The core
idea underlying this service clustering-based HSA design is to build a more distributed
storage structure compared with the current HSA. However, the chaining relationships
connecting service, service group and service cluster need to be carefully maintained in
order to support the indexing and discovery operations.
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CHAPTER 4. Design Service Level Agreement for
Competitive Service Market
In the competitive service market, the business relationships between a composite
service provider and its controlled atomic service providers are framed in terms of the
service level agreements (SLAs). Every composite service provider signs a SLA with each
of its controlled atomic service provider. Without signing SLA with an atomic service
provider, the composite service provider cannot include the related atomic service in the
service composition process.
From the system management perspective, a SLA provides parameters that a sys-
tem manager can use to discover, invoke and monitor various types of resources during
the service provisioning process. In a variety of application domains, such as wireless
network management and multimedia content delivery, SLA has been used to deliver
services that both meet the customer’s QoS requirements and satisfy the system re-
source constraints [33][34][35]. In the ﬁeld of services computing, a SLA-based resource
management system for the enterprise information architecture is investigated in [36].
In this research, the authors propose a queuing-based performance prediction scheme
to support the service selection while ensuring that the realized QoS metrics match the
pre-determined SLA speciﬁcations.
Our research focus is on the SLA design in the context of competitive service market.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the existing works on the SLA design is to model
the SLA establishment as a negotiation process [37][38][39]. Due to the complex business
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dynamics of a competitive service market, the negotiation-based SLA design protocol
cannot capture every possible scenario during the life-cycle of a service market. We
will address this issue by identifying diﬀerent SLA design patterns and investigate their
respective design methodologies.
We start this chapter by introducing the constituent components of the SLA. Sec-
ondly, we identify two essential SLA design patterns in the context of competitive service
market and discuss their respective design methodologies. Thirdly, we build a stochastic
model for the dynamic business relationships framed by coexisting SLA design protocols
and derive a set of performance metrics that can help market players to make strategic
and operational decisions.
4.1 Service Level Agreement: the Constituent Components
and the Basic Design Patterns
A generic SLA structure is speciﬁed in terms of three components: service identity,
QoS metrics and service cost [40][41][42]. In the current research, we focus on the SLA
design issues between a composite service provider and its controlled atomic service
providers. Hence, the service identity,e.g., ASi stands for the atomic service delivered
by the related atomic service provider. Each service is associated with a QoS metrics
set developed from various evaluation perspectives, such as availability, response time
and security level,etc. The QoS metrics set for a given service ASi is denoted as Qi =
{Q1, . . . , Qn}, where n represents the number of QoS metrics to be considered and
Qj denotes the j-th QoS metrics. In the competitive service market, each service can
have multiple providers, which are heterogeneous in terms of the realization of each
QoS metrics. A particular service provider aspt of ASi assigns a speciﬁc value to each
metrics, e.g., Qj. This assignment is based on the capability of service provider itself
and its coordination with the service purchaser. For instance, a data center determines
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its average response time based on the combined hardware software capability and the
predicted incoming rates of the requests. We use QV ti = {QV ti,1, . . . , QV ti,n} to store these
values, where QV ti,j is the value for the j-th QoS metrics, Qj assigned by aspt with respect
to service ASi. QV ti is referred to as QoS value set. A signed SLA instance is therefore
formulated as a triple SLA = (ASi,QV ti,Pi), where ASi indicates the service to be
delivered. The signed SLA obligates the involved atomic service provider to deliver the
service in accordance with the stipulated QoS value set, i.e., QV ti, while the composite
service provider pays the listed service charge, i.e., Pi. Naturally, the service charge
should cover the operation cost of atomic service provider while generating a certain
amount of proﬁt to itself.
4.1.1 The SLA Design Patterns
Bilateral negotiation is one of the most commonly used decision making processes in
the business world and ﬁts to the SLA design scenario where there only have one service
seller and one service purchaser [43]. Figure.4.1 displays the bilateral negotiation pattern
for the SLA design. The arrows at both ends reﬂect the dynamics of oﬀer and counter
oﬀer throughout the bilateral negotiation process.
Figure 4.1 Bilateral negotiation pattern of SLA design
Figure.4.2 is the activity diagram of the bilateral negotiation process [44]. Besides
the essential decision making processes made on both the seller side and the purchaser
side, we also factor in the negotiation deadline. This is due to the reason that the
negotiation will not continue forever in practice. When implementing a negotiation
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protocol, this type of negotiation deadline is instantiated as the maximal number of
negotiation iterations.
Figure 4.2 Activity diagram for the bilateral negotiation-based SLA design
A basic characteristic of bilateral negotiation process is that the reached agreement
only reﬂects a compromised result after several rounds of bargaining. It is ad-hoc and
very hard to be predicted. In terms of the SLA design in the competitive service market,
this type of uncertainty indicates that the service cost or the QoS value set cannot
be determined beforehand. Under some scenarios, it is necessary for the composite
service provider to reach a target for a speciﬁc QoS metrics over a particular service.
For instance, composite service provider cspo needs to ensure that at least one of its
controlled atomic service providers is able to deliver an atomic service with the mean
time between failure (MTBF) being longer than two hours. We term the related design
problem as target-oriented SLA design, which is the second type of SLA design pattern
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to be discussed in this research. In order to ensure signing a SLA with a predetermined
target, having more than one candidate service providers is preferable. Comparing with
the bilateral negotiation-based SLA design featured as a one-to-one business relationship,
the target-oriented SLA design tends to involve multiple service providers. The auction
process ﬁts naturally to this type of business scenario with twofold features: one-to-many
relationship and a predetermined target need to be reached [45].
Figure 4.3 An example of buyer-dominant auction for the SLA design
Figure.4.3 is a conceptual diagram of the auction process, where we have one service
purchaser which stands for the composite service provider in the competitive service
market, and multiple atomic service providers.
Figure.4.4 is the activity diagram for the auction process. A synchronization transi-
tion is included to ensure every invited seller will be considered in the auction protocol.
Introducing this mechanism is important due to the possible communication delay in
the real service market.
From the viewpoint of economic theory, the diﬀerence between the bilateral negotia-
tion and the auction is far from clear [46]. For instance, a one-to-many auction process
can be simulated using multiple one-to-one bilateral negotiation processes. The indus-
trial practices and empirical evidence show that the bilateral negotiation can be used to
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Figure 4.4 Activity diagram for the target-oriented SLA design pattern us-
ing auction
establish very complicated business relationships, which usually involve the bargaining,
estimation and concession. On the other side, the auction process performs well to meet
a well-established business target by exploiting potential competitions.
4.2 Negotiation-based Multi-attributes SLA Design Using
Bayes Estimator
In the practical SLA design, price and quality-of-service (QoS) are two essential
components that need to be considered. As we discussed previously, QoS is composed
of a set of performance metrics. In practice, this set of metrics can be aggregated into
a quality level (L) which is treated as an umbrella QoS index dedicated to capture the
whole set of related performance metrics in a uniﬁed way. A typical formulation of
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quality level is given in Equation.4.1.
L =
i=n∑
i=1
wiqi (4.1)
In Equation.4.1, wi stands for the weight of the corresponding QoS metric qi. The
exact formula of Equation.4.1 and the weight values can vary by the studied system. In
this research, we just assume the existence of aggregated quality level. A SLA design
taking both price tag and quality level into account is referred to as a multi-attributes
SLA design. In this section, we are going to discuss the concrete design issues for the
negotiation-based multi-attributes SLA design using Bayes estimator.
Performing as autonomous agents in the competitive service market, both composite
service providers and atomic service providers hold private knowledge over their respec-
tive business goals, operation costs and even social responsibilities. This knowledge
comes from the understanding of its own system dynamics and the accumulated experi-
ences learned from interacting with other agents. For example, from the proﬁt-oriented
perspective, a higher selling price indicates a larger proﬁt margin to an atomic service
provider. Nevertheless, a higher selling price will also reject the potential service pur-
chasers and cause future losses. Delivering service with higher quality level can attract
the potential service consumer but the associated operation cost may counteract those
positive eﬀects. In the real business world, there always exists a complicated balance
point between increasing and decreasing in terms of both price and quality level. This is
especially true when we not only consider an agent’s own business interest but also take
into account its relationships with other market players. Based on this knowledge, an
agent should be able to make an evaluation about how to maximize its business beneﬁt
from doing business with other agents. In terms of the price and quality level which
characterize the business relationship connecting a composite service provider and an
atomic service provider, this evaluation is represented as an optimal utility pair :
• With respect to a given atomic service, a composite service provider holds a pair
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of quality level and price, which can return itself the maximal business beneﬁt by
purchasing this service from the atomic service provider.
• With respect to a given atomic service, an atomic service provider holds a pair
of quality level and price, which can return itself the maximal business beneﬁt by
selling this service to the composite service provider.
For notation purposes, the optimal utility pair for an atomic service provider, aspi, is
denoted as θi = (θip, θ
i
l), where θ
i
p and θ
i
l represent the service price and the quality level
in an optimal SLA conﬁguration from the aspi’s perspective. Similarly, the optimal
utility pair for a composite service provider,θo = (θop, θ
o
l ), where θ
o
p and θ
o
l represent
the service price and the quality level in an optimal SLA conﬁguration from the cspo’s
perspective. In a competitive service market, this type of information tends to be hidden
from other agents.
Naturally, both a composite service provider and an atomic service provider would
like to sign a SLA with speciﬁcations being near to their respective optimal utility pairs.
Therefore, in the context of SLA design, the bilateral negotiation process conducted
between a composite service provider and an atomic service provider is characterized by
a process of making concessions from the optimal utility pairs on both sides. From the
viewpoint of a negotiation agent, if the optimal utility pair of the negotiation counterpart
is known, then it can develop a strategy to maximize its utility. From the game theoretic
perspective, this is to transfer a game of incomplete information to a game of complete
information.
In our research, we assume the accessibility of public information resources, which
enables an agent to build a subjective evaluation of its negotiation counterpart. Fur-
thermore, the oﬀer proposed by the negotiation counterpart constitutes additional infor-
mation that can be exploited. The combination of pre-owned subjective evaluation and
updated information can be eﬃciently utilized under the framework of Bayesian analy-
54
sis [47][48]. We formulate the SLA design scheme between cspo and aspi in Algorithm.4.1
which includes a Bayes estimator in each negotiation iteration.
Algorithm 4.1 Bayes estimator-based SLA design
1: l = 1, η = 0;
2: Initialize θ̂o;
3: while (k ≤ K) and (η = 0) do
4: α = calOﬀeri(θi, θ̂o)
aspi informs cspo of its oﬀer: α;
5: η = evaOﬀero(θ
o, α);
6: if η = 1 then
7: Return (SLA is signed in terms of α);
8: end if
9: θ̂i = estOUP(α);
10: β = calOﬀero(θ
o, θ̂i)
cspo informs aspi of its counter oﬀer: β;
11: η = evaOﬀeri(θ
i, β);
12: if η = 1 then
13: Return (SLA is signed in terms of β);
14: end if
15: θ̂o = estOUP(β);
16: k = k + 1;
17: end while
18: if {η = 0} then
19: aspi does not sign SLA with cspo;
20: end if
In Algorithm 4.1, lines between 4 and 16 represent the negotiation conducted at each
iteration. In reality, the negotiation cannot continue forever. Hence, we let K denote
the maximum acceptable rounds of negotiation. η is a control variable monitoring the
negotiation status. Once an agreement is reached, η will be switched to 1 and the
algorithm will jump out of the while loop. If both agents cannot reach an agreement
within the maximal number of iterations, then no SLA will be signed. At each iteration,
each negotiation agent has two essential operations:
• evaOﬀeri for aspi and evaOﬀero for cspo. This set of operations is to evaluate
whether accept the counterpart’s oﬀer or not. For instance, if the counterpart’s
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oﬀer lies within a certain range, then it will accept the oﬀer. The implementation of
evaOﬀeri can diﬀer with the implementation of evaOﬀero due to their respective
utilities.
• estOUPi for aspi and estOUPo for cspo. This set of operations is to estimate
the optimal utility pair of the negotiation counterpart.
• calOﬀeri for aspi and calOﬀero for cspo. This set of operations is to calculate
the oﬀer based on a given strategy.
The operations of evaOﬀeri(o) and calOﬀeri(o) will be discussed in more details later.
Since Algorithm.4.1 assumes that it is aspi to initialize the negotiation, and thus the
estimation of θo has to be manually setup at the beginning of the ﬁrst iteration. This is
what line 2 represents and can be calculated using the prior subjective estimation of θo
by aspi. The core of Algorithm.4.1 is the Bayes estimators: estOUPi and estOUPo.
In the following, we discuss how the Bayes estimator is derived in the context of bilateral
negotiation.
Due to the symmetrical format, we just look into the estimation of θi from the
perspective of cspo. The estimation quality is evaluated based on a selected criterion,
like the quadratic loss function, i.e., L(θ̂i, θi) = (θ̂i−θi)2. Here, θ̂i denotes the computed
value based on Bayes estimator. It should be able to minimize the expected value of
L(θ̂i, θi) given updated information: the oﬀer of aspi, i.e., α.
θ̂i = argmin E[L(θ̂i, θi)|α]
= argmin E[(θ̂i − θi)2|α] ∀θ̂i ∈ Φ (4.2)
By re-writing θ̂i − θi as θ̂i + E[θi|α]− E[θi|α]− θi, we have
E[(θ̂i − θi)2|α] = y1 + y2 + y3 (4.3)
where
y1 = E[(θ̂i − E[θi|α])2|α]
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y2 = E[(E[θ
i|α]− θi)2|α]
y3 = 2E[(E[θ
i|α]− θi)(θ̂i − E[θi|α])|α]
Note that θ̂i does not have any control over the computation of item y2, and y3 = 0 since
E[(E[θi|α]− θ̂i)(θi − E[θi|α])|α] = 0.
Thus,
θ̂i = argmin E[(θ̂i − θi)2|α]
= argmin E[(θ̂i − E[θi|α])2|α]
= E[θi|α]
=
∫
Φ
θif(θi|α) dθi (4.4)
Equation.4.4 explicitly stipulates how a Bayes estimator of the negotiation counterpart’s
optimal utility pair should be computed at each iteration. In the probability theory, this
formula is also referred to as the conditional expectation [49] In Equation.4.4, f(θi|α) is
the conditional distribution of θi given α, and is referred to as the posterior distribution
in the Bayesian analysis [50]. It depends on the likelihood of α given θi and the prior dis-
tribution of θi. The formula given in Equation.4.4 is deﬁned over a continuous domain,
which can become unsolvable once the related probability distributions become compli-
cated. In the next, we will discuss how to solve it numerically in the two-dimensional
space for a multi-attributes SLA design.
4.2.1 Numerical Scheme for the Two-Dimensional SLA Design Using Bayes
Estimator
The Bayes formula can become unsolvable for high-dimensional parameter space and
complicated probability distributions [50]. Hence, we choose to discretize the original
continuous parameter space. With respect to the two-dimensional domain of {price} ×
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{quality level}, the discretization operation is formally represented as:
(θi,ap , θ
i,b
l , a = 1, ..., n1, b = 1, ...,m1) = discreteSpace([θ
i
p.low, θ
i
p.high]⊗ [θil.low, θil.low])
(θo,ap , θ
o,b
l , a = 1, ..., n2, b = 1, ...,m2) = discreteSpace([θ
o
p.low, θ
o
p.high]⊗ [θol.low, θol.high])
(4.5)
In Equation.4.5, θip.low and θ
i
p.high determine the range of θ
i
p and are held by cspo as a
prior knowledge over aspi. Similar explanations apply to [θ
i
l.low, θ
i
l.high], [θ
o
p.low, θ
o
p.high] and
[θol.low, θ
o
l.high] as well. However, the latter two reﬂect the prior knowledge of aspi over cspo.
The procedure of discreteSpace is to build a two-dimensional grid and use the central
point on each grid cell as one hypothetical optimal utility pair. With respect to this two-
dimensional parameter space, we use nj : j = 1, 2 to represent the number of cells along
the dimension of “price” and use mj : j = 1, 2 to represent the number of cells along the
dimension of “quality level”. Hence, calling Equation.4.5 returns two two-dimensional
arrays: (θi,ap , θ
i,b
l , a = 1, ..., n1, b = 1, ...,m1) and (θ
o,a
p , θ
o,b
l , a = 1, ..., n2, b = 1, ...,m2).
The focus of this section is to discuss how the Bayes estimator is implemented on this
two-dimensional parameter space and is applied to the multi-attributes SLA design which
takes both price and quality level into account. The concrete design of Algorithm.4.1 in
the context of multi-attributes SLA design over a discrete parameter space is given in
Algorithm.4.2.
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Algorithm 4.2 Two dimensional SLA design using Bayes estimator
1: (θi,ap , θ
i,b
l , a = 1...n1, b = 1...m1) = discreteSpace([θ
i
p.low, θ
i
p.high]⊗ [θil.low, θil.low]);
2: (θo,ap , θ
o,b
l , a = 1...n2, b = 1...m2) = discreteSpace([θ
o
p.low, θ
o
p.high]⊗ [θol.low, θol.high]);
3: fprior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l ) =
1
n1∗m1 ∀a = 1...n1, b = 1...m1;
4: fprior(θ
o,a
p , θ
o,b
l ) =
1
n2∗m2 ∀a = 1...n2, b = 1...m2;
5: θ̂o = (θ̂op, θ̂
o
l ) = (0.5 ∗ (θop.low + θop.high), 0.5 ∗ (θol.low + θol.high));
6: k = 1, η = 0;
7: while {k ≤ K) and (η = 0)} do
8: αk = calOﬀeri(θ
i, θ̂o);
aspi informs cspo of its oﬀer: α
k;
9: η = evaOﬀero(θ
o, αk);
10: if η = 1 then
11: Return (SLA is signed in terms of αk);
12: end if
13: [{fk+1prior(θi,ap , θi,bl ) : a = 1...n1, b = 1...m1}, θ̂i] = estOUPo(αk, {fprior(θi,ap , θi,bl ) : a =
1...n1, b = 1...m1}, k);
14: βk = calOﬀero(θ
o, θ̂i);
cspo informs the aspi of its counter oﬀer: β
k;
15: η = evaOﬀeri(θ
i, βk);
16: if η = 1 then
17: Return (SLA is signed in terms of αk);
18: end if
19: [{fk+1prior(θo,ap , θi,bl ) : a = 1...n2, b = 1...m2}, θ̂o] = estOUPi(βk, {fprior(θo,ap , θi,bl ) : a =
1...n2, b = 1...m2}, k);
20: k = k + 1;
21: end while
22: if η = 0 then
23: aspi does not sign SLA with cspo;
24: end if
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In Algorithm.4.2, the implementation issues of evaOﬀero and evaOﬀeri will be
discussed in section.4.2.2. An estimation-based oﬀer proposition approach will be inves-
tigated in section.4.2.3. The Bayes estimator of the counterpart’s optimal utility pair,
e.g., estOUPi, is the core of this algorithm and is given in Algorithm.4.3.
4.2.2 Oﬀer Evaluation Criteria
The operation of oﬀer evaluation is to determine whether to accept or reject the
negotiation counterpart’s oﬀer based on a set of criteria. We use diﬀerent subscripts, i
and o, in the evaOﬀeri and evaOﬀero to stress that the two sides can diﬀer in their
respective evaluation criteria. In this study, we consider two types of evaluation criteria.
One tends to focus on the business interest of one side only and the other one aims to
improve the collaboration of two sides.
Evaluation criterion 1 The agreement will be reached if either of the following two
conditions is satisﬁed.
1. On the side of cspo :, If the diﬀerence between the aspi’s oﬀer and the cspo’s
optimal utility pair is within a given range, then cspo will accept the oﬀer.
Formally, we have
αkp < r1 × θop and αkl > r2 × θol ∃1 ≤ k ≤ K (4.6)
In Equation.4.6, αkp and α
k
l represent the price oﬀer and the quality level
oﬀer respectively which are proposed by aspi at the k-th iteration. r1 and r2
reﬂect the concession degrees that the cspo would like to make in the reached
agreement. Naturally, r1 > 1 and r2 < 1.
2. On the side of aspi : If the diﬀerence between the cspo’s oﬀer and the aspi’s
optimal utility pair is within a given range, then aspi will accept the oﬀer.
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Formally, we have
βkp > r3 × θip and βkl < r4 × θil ∃1 ≤ k ≤ K (4.7)
In Equation.4.7, r3 and r4 reﬂect the degrees of concession that the seller
would like to make in the reached agreement. Naturally, r3 < 1 and r4 > 1.
Evaluation criterion 2 From the viewpoint of the collaboration, a settled agreement
should consider the utility of both sides at the same time. However, Evaluation
criterion 1 does not take the combined utility into account. An applicable metrics
to consider both sides’ beneﬁts is referred to as the aggregated utility function [37].
U slap = wip ∗ θip + wop ∗ θop wip + wop = 1
U slal = wil ∗ θil + wol ∗ θol wil + wol = 1 (4.8)
In Equation.4.8, we use U slap and U slal to represent the price and quality level part of
the utility of signed SLA respectively. The utility pair of a signed SLA, referred to
as combined utility pair, is thus represented as U sla = {U slap ,U slal }. In Equation.4.8,
wip and w
o
p capture the respective inﬂuences of aspi and cspo on the price part of
the resulting utility; while wil and w
o
l capture the respective inﬂuences of aspi and
cspo on the quality level part of the resulting utility. The deﬁnition of Equation.4.8
enables us to quantify the degree of collaboration for a signed SLA, and can be
used as an oﬀer evaluation criterion, which is referred to as Evaluation criterion
2 in our research. The agreement is reached if either one of the following conditions
is satisﬁed.
1. On the side of cspo : If the diﬀerence between the aspi’s oﬀer and the cspo’s
estimated combined utility pair is within a given range, then cspo will accept
the oﬀer. Formally, we have
√
(αkp − U estSLAop )2 + (αkl − U estSLAol )2 < r5 ∃1 ≤ k ≤ K (4.9)
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In Equation.4.9, r5 reﬂects the concession degree that the cspo would like to
make in the reached agreement.
2. On the side of aspi : If the diﬀerence between the cspo’s oﬀer and aspi’s
estimated combined utility pair is within a given range, then aspi will accept
the oﬀer. Formally, we have
√
(βkp − U estSLAip )2 + (βkl − U estSLAil )2 < r6 ∃1 ≤ k ≤ K (4.10)
In Equation.4.10, r6 reﬂects the degree of concession that the seller would like
to make in the reached agreement.
In the above equations, we use the superscripts {estSLAo} and {estSLAi} to
represented the estimated combined utility from either the side of cspo or the side
of aspi. This is due to the reason that a negotiation agent cannot know exactly the
negotiation counterpart’s optimal utility pair, which is required in Equation.4.8.
Therefore, when implementing the Evaluation criterion 2, we have to use the
estimated counterpart’s optimal utility pair.
4.2.3 Estimation-guided Oﬀer Proposition
An accurate estimation of the counterpart’s optimal utility pair can help a negoti-
ation agent to capture the counterpart’s bargaining position and develop appropriate
oﬀer proposition strategies. For instance, according to the Evaluation criterion 1,
an estimation of the counterpart’s optimal utility pair directly points the direction of
making concession. On the other hand, with respect to the Evaluation criterion 2,
an estimated combined utility pair is used as the target point indicating the direction of
making concessions. These observations lead us to develop the estimation-guided oﬀer
proposition strategy. Figure.4.5 illustrates a snapshot of this type of oﬀer proposition
strategy invoked by cspo when we use Evaluation criterion 1.
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Figure 4.5 Estimation-guided oﬀer proposition
In Figure.4.5, the estimated optimal utility of aspi is marked as A, we add the
superscript est to aspi to stress the fact that it is not the real optimal utility pair. The
real optimal utility pair of cspo is marked as C. When Evaluation criterion 1 is
used, cspo will try to approach the aspi’s optimal utility pair along with the direction of
C → A. The distance of CB stands for the degree of the concession. The projection of
the concession onto the axis of price represents the price update; and the projection onto
the axis of quality level represents the quality level update. In the bilateral negotiation-
based SLA design using Bayes estimator, the estimation of the negotiation counterpart’s
optimal utility pair will be updated at each iteration based on the counterpart’s oﬀer.
This is reﬂected through the ever-changing position of A in the context of the Figure.4.5.
4.2.4 Implementation of Bayes Estimator for the Optimal Utility Pair
Algorithm.4.3 lists the procedures for implementing the Bayes estimator for the op-
timal utility pair. The objective of Algorithm.4.3 is to compute E[θi|α]. In the two-
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dimensional discrete parameter space of [θip.low, θ
i
p.high]⊗ [θil.low, θil.low], we have
E[θi|α] = E[(θip, θil)|α]
=
a=n1∑
a=1
b=m1∑
b=1
(θi,ap , θ
i,b
l )fposterior((θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l )|α) (4.11)
According to Bayes formula [50],
fposterior((θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l )|α) =
flikelihood(α|θi,ap , θi,bl ) ∗ fprior(θi,ap , θi,bl )
fmarginal(α)
(4.12)
Therefore,
E[θi|α] =
a=n1∑
a=1
b=m1∑
b=1
(θi,ap , θ
i,b
l )
flikelihood(α|θi,ap , θi,bl ) ∗ fprior(θi,ap , θi,bl )
fmarginal(α)
(4.13)
In the above derivations, α represents an oﬀer proposed by aspi. When we consider the
above numerical scheme in the context of a given negotiation iteration, k, α will be re-
placed with αk. In order to get fposterior((θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l )|α), we need three diﬀerent probability
distributions: fprior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l ), flikelihood(α|θi,ap , θi,bl ) and fprior(θi,ap , θi,bl ). The computation
procedure of marginal distribution is given in Algorithm.4.3. The computation of these
three probability distributions are discussed subsequently.
For simplicity, we just focus on the side of cspo, i.e., the Bayes estimator of θ
i
p and
θil from the viewpoint of cspo. The discussion from the other direction is similar.
Prior distribution In accordance with the discretization scheme, the prior distribution
is to be considered for each parameter pair (θi,ap , θ
i,b
l ). At the very beginning,
we do not have any knowledge over the distribution model of the negotiation
counterpart’s optimal utility pair. Hence, we can just assume it follows uniform
distribution over the discrete parameter space. At the k-th negotiation iteration,
we treat the counterpart’s oﬀer at the (k-1)-th iteration as the knowledge to derive
the prior distribution. In other words, we use the posterior distribution of (θi,ap , θ
i,b
l )
given αk−1 as the prior distribution at the k-th iteration. Therefore, we have
fkprior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l ) = fposterior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l |αk−1) (4.14)
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Algorithm 4.3 estOUPo(α
k, {fkprior(θi,ap , θi,bl ) : a = 1...n1, b = 1...m1}, k):Bayes estima-
tor for the optimal utility pair of aspi
1: fmarginal(α
k) = 0;
2: for a = 1 : n1 do
3: for b = 1 : m1 do
4: flikelihood(α
k|θi,ap , θi,bl ) = calProb(θi,ap , θi,bl , αk, k);
5: fmarginal(α
k) = fmarginal(α
k) + flikelihood(α
k|θi,ap , θi,bl ) ∗ fkprior(θi,ap , θi,bl );
6: end for
7: end for
8: (θ̂ip, θ̂
i
l) = 0;
9: for a = 1 : n1 do
10: for b = 1 : m1 do
11: fposterior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l |αk) =
flikelihood(α
k|θi,ap ,θi,bl )∗fkprior(θi,ap ,θi,bl )
fmarginal(αk)
;
12: (θ̂ip, θ̂
i
l) = (θ̂
i
p, θ̂
i
l) + (θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l ) ∗ fposterior(θi,ap , θi,bl |αk);
13: end for
14: end for
15: Return : [{fposterior(θi,ap , θi,bl |αk) : a = 1...n1, b = 1...m1)}, (θ̂ip, θ̂il)];
In Equation.4.14, αk−1 = (αk−1p , α
k−1
l ) stands for the aspi’s oﬀer at the (k-1)-
th iteration. fposterior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l |αk−1) is the posterior distribution, which is to be
computed at (k-1)-th iteration. The superscript k of fkprior(θ
i,a
p , θ
i,b
l ) is used to
indicate the fact that it is the prior distribution used at the k-th negotiation
iteration. This relationship is reﬂected in the output parameters at lines 13 and
19 in Algorithm.4.2, and in the input parameter used by Algorithm.4.3.
Likelihood computation The bilateral negotiation is characterized as a process where
both negotiation partners will make concessions as the negotiation proceeds. In
practice, the starting oﬀer of a negotiation agent tends to enlarge its short term
business beneﬁt instead of focusing on long run collaborations and market stabil-
ities. For instance, the α1p  θip and α1l  θil . This kind of oﬀer initialization
strategy also helps hiding the real optimal utility pair and leave more spaces for
bargaining. If the agreement cannot be reached, then the next-step oﬀer will move
away from the initialization oﬀer by making concessions in the direction of ap-
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proaching the negotiation target. Hence, a theoretically predictable oﬀer at each
iteration can be represented as a function of initialization oﬀer and iteration num-
ber. We refer this oﬀer as round-dependent benchmark oﬀer. For instance, the
price part in the round-dependent benchmark oﬀer of aspi can be computed with
the formula like Equation.4.15 when assuming the linear concession strategy.
αkp = r ∗ θip − ρ ∗ (k − 1) (4.15)
In Eq.4.15, μ stands for the decreasing rate; r ∗ θip represents the starting oﬀer
and r > 1. To capture the unaccounted uncertainties, we can assume that the
proposed oﬀer should follow a probabilistic distribution being peak at this round-
dependent benchmark oﬀer. A triangular probabilistic distribution or a Gaussisn
distribution can be used. The likelihood function, denoted as flikelihood(α
k|θi,ap , θi,bl )
stands for the conditional probability of the oﬀer αk when the optimal utility pair is
assumed to be equal to (θi,ap , θ
i,b
l ). Hence, the variable of θ
i
p in Equation.4.15 should
be replaced with θi,ap to compute the corresponding round-dependent benchmark
oﬀer.
Marginal distribution The marginal distribution of oﬀer αk is calculated in Eq.4.16.
The operations between line 2 to line 7 in Algorithm.4.3 implement the corre-
sponding computation.
fmarginal(α
k) =
a=n1∑
a=1
b=m1∑
b=1
flikelihood(α
k|θi,ap , θi,bl )fkprior(θi,ap , θi,bl ) (4.16)
4.2.5 Experimental Study (1)
In the ﬁrst experimental setting, we implement evaOﬀero and evaOﬀeri based on
Evaluation criterion 1. According to this oﬀer evaluation criterion, the agreement
will only be reached either within a small range near (θip, θ
i
l) or within a small range near
(θop, θ
o
l ). One of the main reasons of setting up this evaluation criterion is to test the
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ability of estimating the opponent’s optimal utility pair. If neither of the negotiation
agent is able to estimate the opponent’s optimal utility pair accurately, then it will be
very hard for the negotiation to settle on an agreement. In this experiment, we consider
two scenarios:
Scenario 1 Both cspo and aspi employ the Bayes estimator, and hence the SLA design
process follows exactly what Algorithm.4.2 guides. The operations of calOﬀero
and calOﬀeri used the estimation-guided oﬀer proposition which is illustrated in
Figure.4.5.
Scenario 2 None of cspo and aspi employs the Bayes estimator, and just uses the central
point of the whole domain as the estimation, e.g., (0.5∗(θip.low+θip.high), 0.5∗(θil.low+
θil.high)).
According to Evaluation criterion 1, when r1 increases and r2 decreases, the cri-
terion of accepting the oﬀer will be relaxed on the side of cspo. Similarly, when r3
decreases and r4 increases, the criterion of accepting the oﬀer will be relaxed on the side
of aspi. We design four diﬀerent combinations of r1, r2, r3 and r4, which are identiﬁed
as Case 1, Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 respectively in Table.4.1.
Table 4.1 Test on the agreement reachability of the negotiation
r1 r2 r3 r4 iterations(scenario 1) iterations(scenario 2)
Case 1 1.15 0.85 0.85 1.15 86 fail
Case 2 1.18 0.82 0.82 1.18 79 fail
Case 3 1.20 0.80 0.80 1.20 75 fail
Case 4 1.22 0.78 0.78 1.22 70 fail
In Table.4.1, the column of iterations(scenario 1) stores the number of iterations
required to reach an agreement for the scenario 1, and the column of iterations(scenario
2) stores the number of iterations required to reach an agreement for the scenario 2. If
the agreement cannot be reached within a pre-determined deadline, we will mark the
corresponding status as fail. The result in Table.4.1 shows two facts:
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1. The number of iterations required for reaching the agreement decreases as we relax
the agreement settling criterion, this matches our expectation.
2. If neither side employs the Bayes estimator, the agreement cannot be reached
within the deadline, which is pre-determined as 200 iterations.
The second observation clearly illustrates the advantage of employing the Bayes
estimator in estimating the negotiation counterpart’s optimal utility pair.
4.2.6 Experimental Study (2)
In the second experimental setting, we implement evaOﬀero and evaOﬀeri based
on Evaluation criterion 2. In Equation.4.8, the combination of wip, w
o
p, w
i
l and w
o
l
reﬂects how a negotiation agent’s business beneﬁt is taken care of in the settled SLA.
For instance, a combination of wip < w
o
p and w
i
l < w
o
l indicates that the signed SLA
tends to treasure the beneﬁt of cspo more; or in other words, cspo has more bargaining
power [51]. This is a typical scenario in the competitive service market, where there
always have multiple service providers for a signal service. In the study, we consider
four diﬀerent weight combinations:
Combination 1 wop > w
i
p and w
o
l > w
i
l , this indicates that in the settling SLA, the
price part and the quality level part of the cspo’s beneﬁt are considered more
important than the corresponding parts of aspi. This weight combination is tested
in Case 1 and Case 2.
Combination 2 wop < w
i
p and w
o
l > w
i
l , this indicates that in the settling SLA, the price
part of the aspi’s beneﬁt is considered more important than the corresponding
part of cspo, while the quality level part of the cspo’s beneﬁt is considered more
important than the corresponding part of aspi.This weight combination is tested
in Case 3 and Case 4.
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Combination 3 wop > w
i
p and w
o
l < w
i
l , this indicates that in the settling SLA, the price
part of the cspo’s beneﬁt is considered more important than the corresponding
part of aspi, while the quality level part of the aspi’s beneﬁt is considered more
important than the corresponding part of cspo. This weight combination is tested
in Case 5 and Case 6.
Combination 4 wop < w
i
p and w
o
l < w
i
l , the price part and the quality level part of the
aspi’s beneﬁt are considered more important than the corresponding parts of cspo.
This weight combination is tested in Case 7 and Case 8.
Table 4.2 Test on the ability of achieving the target utility
{wip, wop} {wil , wol } {U slaTp ,U slaTl } {U sla1p ,U sla1l } {U sla2p ,U sla2l }
Case 1 {0.30, 0.70} {0.40, 0.60} {870, 71} {864.641, 71.661} {811.612, 76.155}
Case 2 {0.20, 0.80} {0.30, 0.70} {830, 74.5} {830.939, 74.017} {801.414, 77.453}
Case 3 {0.70, 0.30} {0.40, 0.60} {1030, 71} {1035.271, 68.596} {1076.497, 68.280}
Case 4 {0.80, 0.20} {0.30, 0.70} {1070, 74.5} {1070.354, 71.541} {1082.343, 73.884}
Case 5 {0.20, 0.80} {0.70, 0.30} {830, 60.5} {825.402, 60.494} {814.466, 61.215}
Case 6 {0.30, 0.70} {0.60, 0.40} {870, 64} {867.560, 63.953} {808.404, 67.632}
Case 7 {0.80, 0.20} {0.70, 0.30} {1070, 60.5} {1096.221, 55.753} {954.157, 70.005}
Case 8 {0.70, 0.30} {0.60, 0.40} {1030, 64} {1043.559, 61.123} {982.759, 67.939}
In Table.4.2, the second and the third column report the weight combinations. Be-
sides these parameter settings, we also report the following set of results:
1. The fourth column reports the target combined utility pair for the settled SLA,
{U slaTp ,U slaTl }. We submitted the real optimal utility pairs of both cspo and aspi
into Equation.4.8. Since an agent’s optimal utility pair is the hidden knowledge
to its counterpart, this target pair only exists theoretically. We use it as the
benchmark in the experimental study.
2. The ﬁfth column reports the result of the SLA designed based on Bayes estimator.
Here, we assume both cspo and aspi employ the Bayes estimator. The achieved
utility pair is represented as {U sla1p ,U sla1l }.
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3. The sixth column reports the result of the SLA designed without using Bayes
estimator. The achieved utility pair is represented as {U sla2p ,U sla2l }.
In terms of the diﬀerence between the reached utility and the target utility, the re-
sults in Table.4.2 clearly demonstrate that the SLA design employing Bayes estimator
outperforms the one without using Bayes estimator in every weight combination.
4.2.7 Related Work and Discussion
Negotiation is an important mechanism to establish business relationships among dif-
ferent market players. Several existing works have been developed focusing on various
facets of the negotiation process design. Li et al.[51] investigate the eﬀect of the outside
options on the reservation price and bargaining power. Zeng et al.[52] propose to use
Bayesian analysis to assist the negotiation process by estimating the negotiation coun-
terpart’s reservation price. Sim et al.[53] further developed the Bayesian learning-based
negotiation process and took into account the negotiation deadline as an estimation vari-
able in order to improve the negotiation performance. Our work can be considered as a
further development on the negotiation process design using Bayesian analysis. More-
over, we extend the existing results and develop the corresponding numerical scheme
in the context of multi-attributes SLA design for the competitive service market. Our
contributions are listed in the following.
• In the context of competitive service market, we clarify the speciﬁc SLA design
scenario to which the bilateral negotiation process can be applied.
• In Equation.4.4, we derive the Bayes estimator in the context of the bilateral nego-
tiation based on the statistical inference theory. The mathematical meaning of the
derived formula clearly demonstrates how does the counterpart’s oﬀer determine
the estimation of its optimal utility pair. This type of rigorous derivation is not
given in [52] and [53].
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• Our research focuses on the multi-attributes SLA design which requires us to
consider the negotiation process in a two-dimensional space. We systematically
discuss how to design the numerical scheme for the corresponding Bayes estimator.
• With the help of the information provided by the Bayes estimator, we propose
the estimation-guided oﬀer proposition strategy. Its ﬂexibility is demonstrated in
diﬀerent oﬀer evaluation criteria.
4.3 Bidding Protocol for Target-Oriented SLA Design
The bilateral negotiation process does not ﬁt well to the target-oriented SLA design
because it does not stipulate any speciﬁc metric values beforehand. In this section, we
develop a bidding protocol for the target-oriented SLA design which is composed of the
following procedures.
• Given an atomic service ASt, composite service provider cspo notiﬁes the providers
belonging to CGto of its requirements on one or more speciﬁc QoS metrics.
• Each related atomic service provider estimates the operation cost with respect
to the received QoS requirements, and proposes a bid rate for signing SLA in
accordance with the received requirements.
• cspo selects the atomic service provider which bids with the smallest rate.
From the standpoint of an atomic service provider which joins the bid, reducing the
proposed bid rate can increase the probability of being selected by the composite service
provider. Nevertheless, charging the buyer with a small rate results in the reduced net
proﬁt for itself. Therefore, achieving the balance between the winning probability and
the net proﬁt is a major concern in the bidding protocol design.
Theoretically, if aspi ∈ CGto knows exactly what other competitors will propose, then
the bid rate of ensuring its winning will be MIN(ξj : ∀ aspj ∈ CGto and j = i) − δ,
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where ξj denotes the bid rate of aspj and δ is a very small positive value. Nevertheless,
a market player tends to hide the sensitive information from its competitors, especially
in a competitive bidding process. Consequently, it is infeasible to compute the best
bid rate explicitly, which depends on knowing exactly the bid rate of others. In this
research, we cast the bidding protocol for the target-oriented SLA design in the Bayesian
game theoretic framework and investigate its analysis process. This approach allows
the existence of incomplete information and captures the resulting randomness of the
competition [54].
A Bayesian game for the bidding protocol between cspo and a set of its controlled
atomic service providers is described by a quadruple BG = {N , ξ,Θ,U}.
• N = asp1 × · · · × aspm is the agent space, where n is the number of participating
game players, and aspi denotes the i-th game player which is an atomic service
provider participating in the bidding game.
• ξ = ξ1 × · · · × ξm is the action space, where ξi is the action of game player aspi.
• θ = θ1 × · · · × θm is the type space, where θi is the set of type values of aspi.
• U = U1 × · · · × Um is the utility space, where Ui is the utility function of game
player aspi;
In the above, m ≤= ‖CGto‖ since not all of the atomic service providers is necessary
to join the bidding game. The action of each game player is its bid rate. The type
value of a game player reﬂects its private valuation over delivering the service. In our
case, the real type value of aspi is its operation cost needed to satisfy the target QoS
metric values. In the competitive service market, this exact type value is hidden from
other agents, aspj : j = i. However, the accessibility to the public market information
resources and other bidders’ behaviors enables an agent to derive a probabilistic distri-
bution of either the type values or the bid values of other agents. The existences of these
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diﬀerent probabilistic models lead to various approaches of bidding protocols, which will
be discussed later in this section.
In the competitive service market, each market player is assumed to behave as a
rational agent, whose action is motivated by maximizing its utility. In the bidding
game, the utility of aspi is computed in Equation.4.17.
U(aspi) = Ii=argmin(ξ1,...,ξm) × (ξi − θi) (4.17)
where
Ii=argmin(ξ1,...,ξm) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 ξi < ξj ∀ j = i
0 otherwise
Equation.4.17 illustrates that, if ξi, the bid of aspi, is the minimum among all of the
game players, then aspi will be selected as the winner, and thus its payoﬀ is equivalent
to ξi − θi; otherwise, its payoﬀ equals to 0.
In the above, we discuss the tradeoﬀ between the selection probability and the re-
sulting proﬁt. The following analysis will quantify this tradeoﬀ probabilistically. If aspi
bids with rate ξi, then the winning probability will be determined by the possibility
that none of other competitors bids with a rate being smaller than aspi. According
to the bidding game setting, the probabilistic model for the action space is a common
knowledge to the game players. Here, we assume that the real bid rate of every agent
follows the uniform distribution on a shared range, [ω1, ω2]. Thus, the probability of
bidding with ξi is
1
ω2−ω1 ; the probability of bidding with value being bigger than ξi is∫ ω2
ξi
1
ω2−ω1dy. Accordingly, the expected utility is computed as
E[U(aspi)] = E[Ii=argmin(ξ1,...,ξm) × (ξi − θi)]
= Pr(ξi < ξj ∀ j = i)× (ξi − θi)
(4.18)
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since
Pr(ξi < ξj ∀ j = i) = (
∫ ω2
ξi
1
ω2 − ω1dy)
m−1
=
(ω2 − ξi)m−1
(ω2 − ω1)m−1 (4.19)
so
E[U(aspi)] = (ω2 − ξi)
m−1
(ω2 − ω1)m−1 × (ξi − θi) (4.20)
The rate ξi that can maximize E[U(aspi)] is obtained by solving
d E[U(Ni)]
d ξi
= 0 (4.21)
After substituting the result of Equation. 4.20 into Equation. 4.21, we get
ξi =
ω2 + (m− 1)θi
m
(4.22)
Equation.4.22 explicitly stipulates the rate that a game player would like to bid in order
to maximize the expected payoﬀ when only incomplete information is ready. Consider
a test case, which is:
• The operation cost of every participating agent is sampled from a uniform dis-
tribution. In Table 4.3, the generated values are listed in the row indexed by
“θi(uniform)”. Moreover, from the viewpoint of a participating atomic service
provider, the bid rate of any competitors is assumed to follow a uniform distribu-
tion on a known range. Therefore, we can use formula given in Equation.4.22 to
compute the bid rate.
Table 4.3 Experimental study of bid rate
The ﬁrst scenario
asp1 asp2 asp3 asp4 asp5
θi(uniform) 111.5 129.2 142.2 123.8 67.6
ξi of scenario 1 119.2 133.4 143.7 129.1 84.1
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The results in Table.4.3 shows that the proposed bid rate of each atomic service provider
keeps the trend of its type value. asp5 will be chosen as the winner due to its having
the lowest bid rate, which is controlled by its type value, θ5. However, there are several
issues aﬀecting the applicability of this approach. The analytical formula only exists
for some simple probabilistic models, like uniform distribution. Secondly, the net proﬁt
of the winner still has a lot of space to get improved. With respect to this particular
test case, the type value of asp1 is 111.5. Theoretically, asp5 can increase its bid to this
value and can still win the auction. However, this relies on a more accurate estimation
of other competitor’s bid. In the following, we are going to investigate these issues.
4.3.1 Monte Carlo-Based Bidding Protocol Design
The closed-form bidding strategy discussed in the above only works for the scenario
where every competitor’s bid rate is assumed to follow simple probabilistic models, e.g.,
uniform distribution. With respect to the more complicated probabilistic models, such
as normal distribution and exponential distribution, the analytical formula is impossible
or at least very hard to get. Here, we investigate the application of Monte Carlo method
in the bidding protocol design [55].
The diﬃculty in deriving the analytical bidding strategy is that the integration in
Equation.4.19 will become unsolvable once the adopted probabilistic model is very com-
plicated. To solve this issue, Monte Carlo method is to sample from the underlying prob-
abilistic distribution, and transforms the original computation in a continuous space into
the computation in a discrete space. Algorithm.4.4 is a Monte Carlo-based procedure
for calculating the bid rate
In Algorithm.4.4, ξ−i represents the set used to store the bid rate of the atomic ser-
vice providers which are aspi’s competitors; K is the number of Monte Carlo iterations.
We use B−i to denote the set of aspi’s competitors and use faspj to denote the probability
distribution of the bid rate for aspj. From the viewpoint of aspi employing mcBid, it
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Algorithm 4.4 mcBid(K, {faspj : aspj ∈ B−i}):Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy
1: ξ−i = ∅;
2: for k = 1 : K do
3: for aspj ∈ B−i do
4: Sample a bid value bj from the probability distribution, faspj ;
5: ξ−i = ξ−i ∪ bj;
6: end for
7: ξki = estCalBid(ξ−i, θi);
8: end for
9: Compute the bid rate of aspi as ξi =
∑k=K
k=1 ξ
k
i
K ;
has to know the probability distribution of the bid rate of its competitors beforehand.
This is the same prerequisite as the one to derive the analytical formula. But it does not
need analytically solving an equation involving the assumed probabilistic distributions.
The operation of estCalBid is to calculate the bid of aspi. This operation is listed
in Procedure.4.1, whose input parameters are the estimated bid rates of its competi-
tors, which are collected through sampling from the known probability distributions in
Algorithm.4.4.
Procedure 4.1 estCalBid(ξ−i, θi): Procedure of calculating aspi’s bid based on the
bid rates of competitors
1: if θi = MIN(ξ−i ∪ θi) then
2: ξi = MIN(ξ−i)− δ;
3: else
4: ξi = θi + σ;
5: end if
Procedure.4.1 calculates aspi’s bid based on the sampled bid rates of its competitors.
If its type value, θi is lower than any of these bid rates, the bidding strategy of ensuring
its winning is to approach the lowest bid rate of its competitors.This is what line 2 in
Procedure.4.1 represents. δ is a small numerical value introduced in the implementation,
and its introduction is to remove the possibility of having two equivalent lowest bid rates.
If aspi ﬁnds that its type value is higher than the lowest bid rate of its competitors, then
it cannot win the auction due to its larger type value. With respect to this scenario, it
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just add a ﬁnite increment,σ, to its type value as an approach to hide its real type value
and deceive its competitors.
4.3.1.1 Experimental Study: One-Dimensional Normal Distribution
We will investigate the adoption of Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy in this section
and the following section. Instead of assuming simple uniform probability distribution,
we will consider more general ones: one is the one-dimensional Normal distribution and
the other one is the bivariate normal distribution.
In this experiment, we assume that ξj ∼ Normal(μ, σ). The corresponding proba-
bility density function is given in Equation.4.23.
f(ξj) =
1√
2πσ
exp(−(ξj − μ)
2
2σ2
) (4.23)
In Equation.4.23, μ is the mean of the bid rate and σ2 is the variance. This probability
information of aspj is held by aspi.
The experiment is setup as follows:
1. The auction has three participating atomic service providers, i.e., asp1, asp2 and
asp3.
2. The probability distribution of the bid rate is assumed to be the same for the three
atomic service providers. If the mean bid rates vary with diﬀerent atomic service
providers, then the one with the smallest mean value tends to win the auction
most of the time no matter whether the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy is
employed or not. In order to validate the eﬀectiveness of the Monte Carlo-based
bidding strategy, we try to ﬁlter out any factors that may aﬀect the auction result.
3. Two tests cases are designed for the comparison. In test case 1, none of the partic-
ipating atomic service providers employs the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy.
The only information that can help an agent to propose its bid is the mean bid rate
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of the competitors. In test case 2, asp1 employs the Monte Carlo-based bidding
strategy, i.e., Algorithm.4.4, while asp2 and asp3 only rely on the mean value in
the bidding process.
The simulation procedure in test case 1 is listed in Procedure.4.2. Since none of the
atomic service providers adopts the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy, the parameters
used in estCalBid are the mean bid rate of competitors. ﬁndWinner is a generic
function of determining the winner based on the proposed bids. bW represent the
auction winner and sP represents the selling price. In this research, the agent proposing
the lowest bid rate is chosen as the winner and its bid is used as the selling price.
Procedure 4.2 testcase1Simulation: Simulation procedure of test case 1
1: for i = 1 : 3 do
2: ξi = estCalBid({μj : aspj ∈ B−i}, θi);
3: end for
4: (bW, sP ) = ﬁndWinner(ξ1, ξ2, ξ3);
The simulation procedure in test case 2 is listed in Procedure.4.3 which diﬀers with
Proc.4.2 in the bid computation of asp1. It is assumed to adopt the Monte Carlo-based
bidding strategy, i.e., mcBid. The experimental results are reported in Figure.4.6.
Procedure 4.3 testcase2Simulation: Simulation procedure of test case 2
1: ξ1 = mcBid(K, fasp2 , fasp3);
2: for i = 2 : 3 do
3: ξi = estCalBid({μj : aspj ∈ B−i}, θi);
4: end for
5: (bW, sP ) = ﬁndWinner(ξ1, ξ2, ξ3);
In the experiment, we consider 50 independent bid cases. Among these 50 bid cases,
we record every bid case where asp1 is chosen as winner. Let γ1 = sP − θ1 denote the
net proﬁt of asp1 in test case 1; similarly, γ2 denotes the net proﬁt of asp1 in test
case 2. Hence, γ2 − γ1 denotes the improved proﬁt when adopting the Monte Carlo-
based bidding strategy. These improved proﬁts are marked with “square” point in the
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Figure 4.6 Experimental result for normal distribution(var = 1)
lower part of Figure.4.6. The upper part of Figure.4.6 records a collection of bid rates
following the assumed distribution, i.e., Normal(80, 1).
Secondly, we consider a diﬀerent probability model where the bid rate is assumed
to follow Normal(80, 5) for every atomic service provider. This probability distribution
is to test whether the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy will still work for a large
variance model. The test result is shown in Figure.4.7.
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Figure 4.7 Experimental result for normal distribution(var = 5)
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For every bid case where asp1 wins the auction, no negative value is observed either
in Figure.4.6 or in Figure.4.7. This observation demonstrates that the employment of
Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy design can improve the proﬁt margin of asp1.
4.3.1.2 Experimental Study:Two-dimensional Bidding Strategy Design
In this section, we investigate the application of Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy
design in the two-dimensional space, where we consider both the price and the quality
level. The proposed bid is thus represented as a pair (ξip, ξ
i
l ), where ξ
i
p represents the
bid rate and ξil represents the bid quality level. This study aims to support the multi-
attributes target-oriented SLA design.
In the one-dimensional auction for the target-oriented SLA design, the utility function
of the composite service provider fully depends on the selling price of the auction winner.
In the two-dimensional auction, the utility function of the composite service provider
depends on both the selling price and the quality level, and can be represented as in
Equation.4.24.
Ucsp(P ,L) = −wp × P
P
+ wl × L
L
(4.24)
In Equation.4.24, wp and wl are the weight factors for the price and quality level re-
spectively. The minus sign before wp indicates that a higher selling price leads to a
smaller utility for the composite service provider. The P and L on the denominator is
to normalize price P and quality level L since their numerical values may have diﬀerent
scales. In the two-dimensional auction for the target-oriented SLA design, the utility
represented in Equation.4.24 will be used as the criterion to guide the atomic service
provider to calculate its bid rate.
Comparing to the bid calculation procedure in the one-dimensional auction, the bid
calculation procedure in the two-dimensional auction is more complicated due to its
inherent multiple choices resulting from the utility formulation. Figure.4.8 illustrates
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how the bid computation scheme works in the two-dimensional auction.
Figure 4.8 Update the bid in the two-dimensional auction
It is assumed to have three atomic service providers. asp1 bids with (ξ
1
p , ξ
1
l ); asp2
bids with (ξ2p , ξ
2
l ) and asp3 bids with (ξ
3
p , ξ
3
l ). The three points corresponding to the bid
pairs are marked in the ﬁgure. For each point, we also plot the line sharing the same
utility with it. For instance, the equation of line where (ξ3p , ξ
3
l ) lies is formulated as
−wp ×
ξxp
P
+ Wq × ξ
x
l
L
= −Wp ×
ξ3p
P
+ Wq × ξ
3
l
L
. (4.25)
Every point locating on this line, e.g., A,B,C and D share the same utility as the
one resulting from the bid (ξ3p , ξ
3
l ). After substituting these bids into Equation.4.24, we
have Ucsp(ξ1p , ξ1l ) > Ucsp(ξ3p , ξ3l ) > Ucsp(ξ2p , ξ2l ). This relationship is also reﬂected by three
parallel lines in Figure.4.8. From the viewpoint of asp1, bidding with (ξ
1
p , ξ
1
l ) ensures
its being selected as the winner. However, its most preferable result is to guarantee
its winning position while maximizing its own utility by increasing the selling price,
downgrading the quality level or both. The example showing in Figure.4.8 gives three
choices:
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• A, having the same price with point (ξ1p , ξ1l ), represents the target update point if
asp1 plans to downgrade the quality level only.
• D, having the same quality level with point (ξ1p , ξ1l ), represents the target update
point if asp1 plans to increase the selling price only.
• B, C and other points locating between A and D, represent the target update
points if aspi plans to increase the selling price and downgrade the quality level at
the same time.
In the experimental study, we assume that (ξip, ξ
i
l ) follows the bivariate normal distribu-
tion, which is N (μ,Σ) [47].
μ = [mean(ξip),mean(ξ
i
l )] Σ =
⎡
⎢⎣ Var(ξip) Cov(ξip, ξil )
Cov(ξip, ξ
i
l ) Var(ξ
i
l )
⎤
⎥⎦ (4.26)
In Equation.4.26, mean(x) represents the mean value of x, Var(x) is the variance of x
and Cov(x, y) is the covariance of x and y. In the study, the concrete parameters are
setup as:
[mean(ξip),mean(ξ
i
l )] = [80, 65]⎡
⎢⎣ Var(ξip) Corr(ξip, ξil )
Corr(ξip, ξ
i
l ) Var(ξ
i
l )
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ 3 0.3
0.3 3
⎤
⎥⎦ ∀ i = 1, 2, 3 (4.27)
Figure.4.9 presents the result for this test case. Similar to the above study on the one-
dimension auction, the upper part of the ﬁgure is the diagram of the data, and the lower
part marks the improved net proﬁt with the associated bid case. The benchmark case
is that every atomic service provider computes the bid based on the trivial estimation,
i.e., the mean values of the competitors’ bid pairs. The investigated tested case is that
asp1 adopts the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy while asp2 and asp3 do not. The
results show that nine bid cases see clear improvement on the net proﬁt for the asp1
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Figure 4.9 Experimental result for bivariate normal distribution
when adopting the Monte Carlo-based bidding strategy design. Here, we use the price-
dominant optimal bid computation, e.g., (ξ1p , ξ
1
l )→ D in Figure.4.8.
4.3.2 Target-Oriented SLA Design in Sequential Auction
With respect to the target-oriented SLA design, the similar auction process can
happen repeatedly involving diﬀerent service requests arriving sequentially along with
the same set of atomic service providers. This scenario can be framed as a speciﬁc SLA
design setting: target-oriented SLA design using sequential auction.
In the previous section, we discuss the auction-based target-oriented SLA design,
which essentially is a one-shot Bayesian game. In practice, just as in the bilateral
negotiation where an agent can learn the negotiation counterpart’s hidden information
from its proposal, a bidding agent can accumulate auction experiences by learning the
competitors’ bidding behaviors and use this experience to guide the bidding process in
the future auction. The existence of this type of learning capability cannot help the one-
shot auction, but will help the decision making process in the sequential auction-based
SLA design. In this section, we are going to investigate the sequential auction using
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Bayes estimator, which is an extension of our previous research in bilateral negotiation.
4.3.2.1 Adaptive Bidding Strategy for the Target-Oriented SLA Design
in Sequential Auction
A common practice for a bidder attending the sequential auction is to start from an
initialization bid, which usually is much higher than its type value, and decrease the bid
in terms of a pre-selected rate if it cannot win the current auction [56]. This common
practice can be further reﬁned and allow the bidder to adapt the bidding strategy in a
more systematic way.
Suppose the bidder does not hold any advanced learning capabilities, like Bayes
estimator, the only information it can exploit is the result of the previous auction. Let
pair {W(n),P(n)} denote the winner and its bid rate in the n-th auction respectively.
The winner’s bid rate is also referred to as closing price hereafter. There have three
diﬀerent scenarios:
1. Assume aspi wins the n-th auction, then with the same auction environment, aspi
can increase its bid rate to enlarge the net proﬁt in the (n+1)-th auction. The
reason behind this inference is that the bid rate proposed in the n-th auction by
aspi already ensures winning the auction, and there usually exists a gap between
this winning bid and the next smallest bid. aspi can exploit this fact by assuming
that this gap will not totally disappear even the competitor may decrease the bid
rate in the (n+1)-th auction.
2. Assume aspi does not win the n-th auction but the closing price is higher than
the type value of aspi, this fact indicates that there still exists possibility to allow
aspi to win the future auctions. However, it should decrease the bid rate from the
current closing price.
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3. Assume aspi does not win the n-th auction and the closing price is lower than the
type value of aspi, this fact theoretically removes any potential winnings for aspi
because at least one of its competitors already manages to bid with a rate being
lower than its type value. With respect to this scenario, we just let it decrease the
bid with a pre-selected rate and to exploit any possibility of winning the future
auctions. The underlying motivation of this design is that a winning bidder may
increase its bid rate in the next auction. Certainly, this decreasement will use the
type value as the bottom line.
This analysis is formalized in Procedure.4.4.
Procedure 4.4 saCalBid(W(n − 1),P(n − 1), ξi(n − 1), θi):Adaptive procedure of
calculating Bi’s bid for the n-th auction
1: if aspi =W(n− 1) then
2: ξi(n) = P(n− 1) +D1i ;
3: else if P(n) > θi then
4: ξi(n) = P(n− 1)−D2i ;
5: else
6: ξi(n) = ξi(n− 1)−D3i ;
7: end if
8: Return ξi(n);
In Procedure.4.4, W(n − 1) and P(n − 1) are the auction winner and selling price
in the (n-1)-th auction respectively. The calculated ξi(n) will be returned and used by
aspi as the bid in the n-th auction. D1i , D2i and D3i correspond to the three diﬀerent bid
changement discussed in the above respectively.
4.3.2.2 Bayes Estimator-based Bidding Strategy for the Target-oriented
SLA Design in Sequential Auction
In this section, we study the bidding strategy design for the target-oriented SLA
design in sequential auction. The algorithm is listed in Algorithm.4.5.
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Algorithm 4.5 bayesBid(ξj(n− 1), n,W(n− 2),P(n− 2)):Bayes estimator-based bid-
ding strategy for the n-th auction round
1: for aspj ∈ B−i do
2: for l = 1 : nj do
3: if n = 3 then
4: fprior(θ
l
j) =
1
nj
;
5: else
6: fprior(θ
l
j) = fposterior(θ
l
j|ξj(n− 1));
7: end if
8: flikelihood(ξj(n−1)|θlj) = compLikelihood(ξj(n−1), ξj(n−2),W(n−2),P(n−
2), θlj);
9: end for
10: fmarginal(ξj(n− 1)) = 0;
11: for l = 1 : nj do
12: fmarginal(ξj(n− 1)) = fmarginal(ξj(n− 1)) + flikelihood(ξj(n− 1)|θlj)× fprior(θlj);
13: fposterior(θ
l
j|ξj(n− 1)) =
flikelihood(ξj(n−1)|θlj)×fprior(θlj)
fmarginal(ξj(n−1)) ;
14: end for
15: θ˜j = 0;
16: for l = 1 : nj do
17: θ˜j = θ˜j + fposterior(θ
l
j|ξj(n− 1))× θlj;
18: end for
19: end for
20: ξi(n) = typeCalBid({θ˜j : ∀aspj ∈ B−i}, θi);
21: Return: ξi(n);
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Algorithm.4.5 is assumed to be invoked by aspi to calculate the bid rate to be pro-
posed in the n-th auction. It needs the result of the (n-2)-th auction and the bid rate
of the (n-1)-th auction. On the other hand, Procedure.4.4 only needs the result of the
(n-1)-th auction to compute the bid for the n-th auction. Hence, Algorithm.4.5 starts
to work only after n > 2. Similar to the Bayesian analysis in Algorithm.4.2, a collection
of candidate values for the real θj is constructed by the discretization operation over the
range of θj, which is [θ
low
j , θ
high
j ]. θj represents the type value of aspj. We denote the
size of this collection as nj.
(θlj : l = 1 : nj) = discreteSpace([θ
low
j , θ
high
j ]) (4.28)
In Algorithm.4.5, typeCalBid computes the bid based on the estimated type values
of its competitors, and is listed in Procedure.4.5. It diﬀers with Procedure.4.1 in using
type values instead of using the estimated bid rates.
Procedure 4.5 typeCalBid(θ−i, θi): Procedure of calculating aspi’s bid based on the
type values of competitors
1: if θi = MIN(θ−i ∪ θi) then
2: ξi = MIN(θ−i)− δ;
3: else
4: ξi = θi + σ;
5: end if
The segment from “Line 2” to “Line 18” is the core of the Bayes estimator-based
bidding strategy design, which computes the posterior distribution of θlj given ξj(n− 1),
the observed bid rate of aspj in the (n-1)-th auction. The computation formula of the
posterior distribution is given in Equation.4.29, which requires the likelihood distribution
and prior distribution as the inputs.
fpost(θ
l
j|ξj(n− 1)) =
flikelihood(ξj(n− 1)|θlj)× fprior(θlj)∑l=nj
l=1 flikelihood(ξj(n− 1)|θlj)× fprior(θlj)
(4.29)
In Algorithm.4.5, the function of compLikelihood is used to compute the likelihood
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of ξj(n − 1) given the type value being equal to θlj. This computation is divided into
two steps:
1. First, we compute the projected bid of aspj in the (n-1)-th auction when its type
value is assumed to be θlj. This projected bid rate, denoted as
̂ξj(n− 1), can be
obtained by calling the computational procedure of saCalBid(W(n − 2),P(n −
2), ξj(n− 2), θlj).
2. Secondly, we use a triangular distribution, with peak at the position of ̂ξj(n− 1),
to compute the likelihood of ξj(n− 1). The rhythm underlying this consideration
is that if θlj is close to the real type value, then the real bid value, ξj(n − 1) will
also be close to the projected bid, ̂ξj(n− 1).
The prior distribution is computed in an updated scheme which is similar to the one
used in computing the Bayes estimator for the bilateral negotiation. The posterior
distribution obtained in the (n-1)-th auction is used as the prior distribution in the n-th
auction. At the very beginning, the prior distribution is assumed to be uniform over the
domain, i.e., fprior(θ
l
j) = 1/nj ∀ l = 1 : nj.
4.3.2.3 Experimental Study
In this section, we conduct the experiments to validate the performance of the Bayes
estimator-based bidding strategy for the target-oriented SLA design in sequential auction
. The test environment is setup as follows:
• There are three participating atomic service providers: asp1, asp2 and asp3. In
test case 1, asp1 is assumed to employ the Bayes estimator and can learn the type
values of asp2 and asp3. This learning capability enables asp1 to propose the bid
using the type value-based bidding strategy, i.e., Procedure.4.5. asp2 and asp3 do
not hold this type of advanced learning capabilities and bid using the self-adaptive
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bidding strategy, i.e., Procedure.4.4. In test case 2, none of the three atomic
service providers holds the capability of Bayes estimator.
• In both test cases, the total number of the sequential auctions is setup as 30.
The type value of asp2 is setup as 1050 and the type value of asp3 is setup as
1100. With respect to asp1, we let its type value increase from 1000 to 1200
with interval of 5. This design is to test how the Bayes estimator aﬀects the
performance under diﬀerent parameter settings. For instance, let us consider two
parameter conﬁgurations of {θasp1 = 1000, θasp2 = 1050, θasp3 = 1100} and {θasp1 =
1200, θasp2 = 1050, θasp3 = 1100}. With the ﬁrst parameter conﬁguration, asp1
tends to propose a lower bid due to its smaller type value, thus it is usually
chosen as the winner. With the second parameter conﬁguration, asp1 tends to
be always the loser due to its larger type value. This prediction should not be
diﬃcult to get when every bidder has the same bidding strategy, i.e., none of them
employs the Bayes estimator-based bidding strategy or hold any advantages in
the competitive bidding process. This experiment aims to show whether adopting
the Bayes estimator-based bidding strategy will help asp1 even under a hostile
environment, like the second parameter conﬁguration.
In Figure.4.10, the horizontal axis is for the type value of asp1 and the vertical axis
is for the corresponding number of times of winning the auction. We can ﬁnd that the
number of times of winning the auction generally follows the descending trend when the
type value increases. Even after the type value becomes higher than 1100, it still can
win a certain number of auctions. This is due to the reason that, by employing Bayes
estimator, aspi is able to grasp the opportunity when its competitors propose bids being
higher than the aspi’s type value. On the other hand, the result of test case 2 reported
in Figure.4.11 shows that asp1 cannot win any auction once its type value is higher than
1100.
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Figure 4.10 Number of times of winning the auction for asp1(test case 1)
The results reported in Figure.4.10 and Figure.4.11 combine to show the eﬀectiveness
of employing the Bayes estimator-based bidding strategy for the target-oriented SLA
design in sequential auction.
4.3.3 Related Work and Discussion
The research reported in this section are divided into two parts: one-shot auction and
sequential auction. Both parts ﬁt to the general scope of the target-oriented SLA design.
The one-shot auction can be analyzed using the classical Bayesian game formulation.
But the restrictions on the underlying probabilistic distributions limit its applicabilities.
We discuss the numerical approaches based on Monte Carlo methods, which is similar
to the works reported in [57] and [58]. One of our main contributions lies in the two-
dimensional Bidding strategy design using Monte Carlo method and the discussions on
the utility maximization strategy based on the competitors’ bid pairs.
In the second part of this section, we develop the Bayes estimator-based bidding
strategy by exploiting the relationship between the proposed bid rate and type value.
This approach depends on some knowledge about the competitors, such as the ratio of
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Figure 4.11 Number of times of winning the auction for asp1(test case 2)
the initialization bid to the type value and the descending speed of the bid rate for each
auction. Although this information can be captured through statistical estimation meth-
ods [59], more detailed models are seeked to be built to capture these unknown factors in
an uniﬁed framework. We are working on designing strategies to learn the initialization
bid, descending speed and type value of an atomic service provider concurrently from
its bid rate using a hierarchical model [50].
4.4 Stochastic Modeling of Dynamic Business Relationships
In accordance with the previous discussions, the business relationships between a
composite service provider and its controlled atomic service providers can be framed by
either bilateral negotiation protocol or auction protocol. The service price speciﬁed in
the settled SLA varies with the protocol that is used to design the SLA. This service
price represents the buying price to the composite service provider and stands for the
selling price to the atomic service provider. From the perspective of a composite service
provider, the buying price plays an essential role when pricing a composite service which
includes that speciﬁc atomic service. From the point of view of the atomic service
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provider, the selling price represents the revenue that is generated by delivering the
related service. Therefore, estimating this service price is important to both sides. In
the context of the stochastic performance analysis, the estimation can be represented
by the long run probability of framing the business relationship with either one of the
SLA design protocols. The modeling approach studied in this section will capture the
dynamic interactions of three sides: composite service provider, atomic service provider
and service request. This investigation not only helps the composite service provider to
estimate the price tag but also provides a controllable approach for the atomic service
provider to actively select the SLA design protocol.
4.4.1 Continuous-Time Markov Chains
In Chapter 2, we brieﬂy introduce the discrete-time Markov chains and their appli-
cations in the performance modeling of composite services. In this section, we will use
continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC), the counterpart of DTMC in the continuous
time space, to investigate the performance of the dynamic business relationships framed
through either bilateral negotiation protocol or auction protocol.
Comparing to the deﬁnition of DTMC, a Markov process is referred to as a CTMC
when the parameter space is continuous, which is usually associated with time space in
practice. The CTMC dynamics is composed of two types of information: the one-step
transition probability from one state to another state, and the average holding time in
one state. This dynamics is characterized by the inﬁnitesimal generator matrix Q [14],
and each entry Q[i, i] is deﬁned in Equation.4.30.
Q[i, j] = lim
h→0
Pr{X(t + h) = j|X(t) = i}
h
∀ i = j (4.30)
The diagonal entry in the Q is computed through the in-out balance relationship, i.e.,∑j=m
j=1 Q[i, j] = 0. For a homogeneous CTMC, the Q[i, j] does not vary with parameter
t. A CTMC can be transformed into a DTMC through the embedding technique. The
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transformed DTMC is called as the embedded DTMC which only captures the prob-
ability transition information of the original CTMC [14]. The CTMC analysis can be
henceforth conducted on its embedded DTMC. Both a CTMC example and its embedded
DTMC are shown in Figure.4.12.
Figure 4.12 A CTMC and its embedded DTMC
4.4.2 The Dynamics of the Business Relationships Framed Through Diﬀer-
ent SLA Design Protocols
The business relationships connecting a composite service provider and a collection
of its controlled atomic service providers can be characterized by a state deﬁned as
Si = (a1, a2), where a1 represents the number of queued requests for a given type of
atomic service and a2 stands for the number of available atomic service providers. The
requests are queued since there exists an upper limit on the number of atomic service
providers that a composite service provider can control. Once a service request cannot
be immediately served due to the unavailability of atomic service providers, this request
will be put into a wait queue owned by the composite service provider. The number
of available atomic service providers varies with time. An atomic service provider can
identify itself as unavailable when serving a request. After ﬁnishing the service provi-
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sioning process, this atomic service provider will join the candidate pool. Throughout
the life cycle of a service market, the reachable business relationships captures by the
states deﬁned this way can be categorized into the following types:
type 1 {a1 > 0 and a2 = 0} corresponds to the scenario where all of the controlled
atomic service providers are involved in providing service to the composite service
provider through some types of SLA while some requests wait in the queue.
type 2 {a1 = 0 and a2 > 0} corresponds to the scenario where a2 atomic service
providers are available to serve the incoming requests while other atomic ser-
vice providers are involved in providing service to the composite service provider
through some types of SLA.
type 3 {a1 = 0 and a2 = 0} corresponds to the scenario where all of the controlled
atomic service providers are involved in providing service to the composite service
provider through some types of SLA while the queue is empty.
Figure.4.13 describes the transition dynamics happening among the states of type
1. An incoming service request will enable system to transit from state (i+1, 0) to (i, 0).
When the system is in state (i+1, 0), a newly available atomic service provider will frame
its relationship with the composite service provider through the bilateral negotiation-
based SLA design protocol. When we choose the ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve scheduling pol-
icy [60], the service request lying in the head of the wait queue will be served. State
(1, 0) is a boundary state among the states of type 1. Its transitions with state (2, 0)
are captured in Figure.4.13, while its transitions with another neighboring state (0, 0)
are captured in Figure.4.15.
Figure.4.14 describes the transition dynamics happening among the states of type 2.
A newly available atomic service provider will move the system from state (0, i) to state
(0, i + 1). On the other hand, an incoming service request will trigger the system start
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Figure 4.13 The transitions among states of type 1
the auction protocol to determine the atomic service provider which will provide the
service to this incoming request. This will cause the system to move from state (0, i+1)
to state (0, i). Similar to the case of state (1, 0), state (0, 1) is also a boundary state
among the states of type 2. Its transitions with state (0, 2) are captured in Figure.4.14,
while its transitions with another neighboring state (0, 0) are captured in Figure.4.15.
Figure 4.14 The transitions among states of type 2
The state (0, 0) is a boundary state connecting the states of type 1 and the states
of type 2. Their relationships are reﬂected in Figure.4.15. An incoming service request
moves the system from state (0, 0) to state (1, 0) of type 1. At state (1, 0), a newly
available atomic service provider will provide the service to this only existing queued
service request after negotiating a SLA with the composite service provider. When
system is in state (0, 1), an incoming service request will trigger the negotiation protocol
between this available atomic service provider and the composite service provider and
move the system to state (0, 0). On the other hand, a newly available atomic service
provider will move the system from state (0, 0) to state (0, 1).
In summation, there are ﬁve types of transitions connecting these diﬀerent types of
states.
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Figure 4.15 The transitions related to state (0, 0)
1. The transition from state (0, i) to state (0, i+ 1) is triggered by the event that an
atomic service provider becomes available.
2. The transition from state (i + 1, 0) to state (i, 0) is triggered by the event that
a newly available atomic service provider is assigned to serve the service request
lying in the head of the queue through the bilateral negotiation-based SLA design
protocol. The auction-based SLA design protocol will not be used here since there
only exists a single atomic service provider associated with this type of transition.
3. The transition from state (i, 0) to state (i + 1, 0) is triggered by the event that a
service request enters the wait queue.
4. When i > 1, the transition from state (0, i + 1) to state (0, i) is triggered by the
event that an atomic service provider wins the auction to serve an arriving service
request.
5. The transition from state (0, 1) to state (0, 0) is triggered by the event that the only
available atomic service provider is assigned to serve the arriving service request
through the bilateral negotiation-based SLA design protocol.
The speed of the ﬁrst type of transition and the speed of the second type of transition are
controlled by the service time of the atomic service providers. The speed of the remaining
types of transitions is controlled by the interarrival times of the service request. These
two facts will be used later to build the CTMC for the dynamic business relationships.
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Comparing to the average service time and the interarrival times for the service
requests, the computational time required for the negotiation protocol and the auc-
tion protocol is considered to be quite small. For instance, at a state of type 2, once
an atomic service provider becomes available, it will immediately be assigned to serve a
queued request after designing the SLA based on bilateral negotiation or auction. Hence,
it is impossible for a state belonging to any of the above three types of states to reach
a state of the form (a1, a2) : a1 ≥ 1 and a2 ≥ 1. The only possible scenario is that
the system starts from the state of (a1, a2) : a1 ≥ 1 and a2 ≥ 1. Once this happens,
depending on the relative diﬀerence between a1 and a2, a serious of instantaneous tran-
sitions will be invoked and a set of associated instantaneous states will be constructed.
Therefore, the system can be thought of starting from (0, a2−a1), (0, 0), and (a1−a2, 0)
respectively. The analysis is illustrated in Figure.4.16.
Figure 4.16 Three types of evolving processes consisting of instantaneous
states
4.4.3 CTMC-Based Performance Analysis
In accordance with the state and transition deﬁnitions, Figure.4.17 shows the Markov
chain model built for capturing the dynamic business relationships connecting a com-
posite service provider and a set of its controlled atomic service providers, which are
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further aﬀected by incoming service requests. In this example, the size of the service
wait queue and the number of the controlled atomic service providers are assumed to be
ﬁve, which determines the size of the constructed Markov chain. The arrival process of
the incoming service request is assumed to follow the Poisson process with the arrival
rate of λ; and the service time for each atomic service provider is assumed to be an
exponential random variable with rate μ. Based on both λ and μ, the rate associated
with each transition is calculated and marked in Figure.4.17. The concrete computation
process are given as follows:
• The transitions from state (0, i) to state (0, i− 1), from state (0, 0) to state (1, 0),
and from state (i, 0) to state (i+1, 0) are triggered by an incoming service request
which has a rate of λ.
• The fact that the system is in state (i, 0) indicates that all of the ﬁve atomic
service providers are involved in the service provisioning process. Based on the
property of the superposition of Poisson processes [15], the associated rate for
making transition from (i, 0) to (i− 1, 0) and from (0, 0) to (0, 1) is 5μ.
• The fact that the system is in state (0, i) indicates that 5−i atomic service providers
are involved in the service provisioning process. Therefore, the associated rate for
making transition from (0, i) to (0, i + 1) is (5− i)μ.
Once a Markov chain model is constructed, the numerical approach or the analytical
approach to get the stationary probability distribution is a standard procedure. Please
refer to [14] and [15] for more details. Our research has two focuses. The ﬁrst one
is about how to build the Markov chain model based on the analysis of the system
dynamics, and has been studied in the above. The second one aims to investigate which
kind of performance metrics can be derived from the constructed Markov model to help
both the composite service provider and the atomic service provider in their respective
managerial decision making process. This focus will be discussed in the following part.
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Figure 4.17 Markov chain model for the dynamic business relationships
framed through diﬀerent SLA design protocols
From the viewpoint of a composite service provider, a related performance metric is:
• What is the expected price tag for this type of atomic service which is bought from
its controlled atomic service providers?
The composite service provider needs this information to compute the price charged to
the consumer over a composite service request which involves this speciﬁc atomic service.
The estimation of the price can be computed as in Equation.4.31.
E[P ] =
i=5∑
i=1
EPn{(i, 0)}×Pr(i, 0) +
i=5∑
i=2
EPa{(0, i)}×Pr(0, i) +EPn{(0, 1)}×Pr(0, 1)
(4.31)
In Equation.4.31, EPn{(i, 0)} represents the expected price tag speciﬁed by the bilat-
eral negotiation-based SLA design initiated at state (i, 0); EPa{(0, i)} represents the
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expected price tag speciﬁed by the auction-based SLA design initiated at state (0, i).
Note that the state (0, 1) corresponds to the negotiation protocol rather than the auction
protocol due to the existence of only one atomic service provider. Another issue in using
Equation.4.31 is the computation of Pr(i, 0) and Pr(0, i). The Markov chain analysis
outputs the stationary probability which represents the long run proportion of staying
in a given state. Let π{(i, j)} denote the stationary probability of state (i, j). The
stationary probability of π{(i, j)} is obtained by solving the system of global balance
equations [15], which are just standard procedures once the Markov model has been
built. However, we can not simply use π{(i, j)} to replace Pr{(i, j)}. For instance,
at state (0, i), the system can move to either state (0, i + 1) or state (0, i − 1). Only
the transition leading to state (0, i − 1) corresponds to the event of invoking the auc-
tion protocol. This portion of π{(0, i)} to be allocated to Pr(0, i) is controlled by the
probability of having a service request arriving earlier than a newly available atomic
service provider. Similarly, for a state of (i, 0), the proportion of invoking a bilateral
negotiation protocol is controlled by the relative speed between the arrival of the atomic
service provider and the arrival of another service request. If an atomic service provider
arrives earlier, a negotiation protocol will be invoked and leave the state of (i, 0). In
summation, we have
Pr{(0, i)} = λ
λ + (5− i)μπ{(0, i)} i = 2, 3, 4
Pr{(i, 0)} = 5μ
λ + 5μ
π{(i, 0)} i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (4.32)
There are three exceptional states: (0, 0), (5, 0) and (0, 5). State (0, 0) does not ini-
tiate any SLA design protocols and is not included in Equation.4.31. There exists
only one output transition for both (5, 0) and (0, 5). Hence, Pr(5, 0) = π{(5, 0)}
and Pr(0, 5) = π{(0, 5)}. Besides the probabilities of Pr{(0, i)} and Pr{(i, 0)} in
Equation.4.31, the computation of the expected price EPn{(i, 0)} and EPa{(0, i)} is
another issue to be addressed. In accordance with the previous discussions on the ne-
100
gotiation protocol design and auction protocol design, the speciﬁed price tags heavily
rely on the concrete implementations. In practice, the general approach of getting this
kind of estimation is to do the density estimation based on the accumulated transac-
tion history records using either nonparametric or parametric method [61][62]. The
estimated density function enables us to compute the expected price tags and other
necessary distribution descriptors, like variance. This type of approach is operational
and performance tunable based on the quality of the accumulated data and the applied
algorithms.
An atomic service provider can have three diﬀerent types of statuses: in the service
provisioning process, in the candidate pool and oﬀ the market. The status of “oﬀ the
market” can be due to a variety of reasons, e.g., maintenance, or terminate the business
relationship with the composite service provider,etc. In the current research setting, we
do not consider the “oﬀ the market” status and assume that the atomic service provider
is either in the service provisioning process or in the candidate pool waiting to be invoked
by the composite service provider. From the perspective of an atomic service provider,
two related performance metrics are listed as follows:
1. What is the long run probability of landing in a scenario of framing the SLA con-
ﬁguration with the composite service provider through the negotiation protocol?
2. What is the long run probability of landing in a scenario of framing the SLA
conﬁguration with the composite service provider through the auction protocol?
These two performance metrics have managerial meanings to the atomic service provider.
If it is very likely for an atomic service provider to get involved into a bilateral negotiation-
based SLA design protocol, then this atomic service provider do not need to worry too
much about the competition. This can bring more bargaining power into its relationship
with the composite service provider. Moreover, some strategic decisions can be made
based on these two performance metrics. In practice, developing successful strategy for
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either the auction process or the bilateral negotiation process can cost a lot of resources,
both computational ones and social ones. Based on these two performance metrics, an
atomic service provider can decide which strategy should be invested in.
Let Qn denote the probability of landing in a negotiation protocol and Qa denote
the probability of landing in an auction protocol. We have:
Qn =
∑i=5
i=1 Pr{(i, 0)}+Pr{(0, 1)}∑i=5
i=1 π{(i, 0)}+ π{(0, 0)}+
∑i=5
i=1 π{(i, 0)}
(4.33)
In Equation.4.33, the physical meaning of Pr{(i, 0)} and its computation has been
discussed in the above. The denominator for the right side of the equation is the sum
of the stationary probability vector and equals to 1. Therefore,
Qn =
i=5∑
i=1
Pr{(i, 0)}+Pr{(0, 1)}. (4.34)
Similarly, we have
Qa =
i=5∑
i=2
Pr{(0, i)}. (4.35)
4.4.4 Related Work and Discussion
A Markov chain model is constructed to model an auction-based logistics market [63].
Instead of focusing on a single type of business relationship framing protocol, our research
focuses on multiple business relationship framing protocols, e.g., bilateral negotiation-
based SLA design and the auction-based SLA design. From the performance analysis
perspective, the research presented in [63] aims to analyze the eﬀects of the system
parameters on the proﬁt of diﬀerent carriers managed by a single type of business re-
lationship. On the other hand, we are interested in developing analytical approaches
to help the decision making processes of both composite service provider and atomic
service providers which are involved in a set of dynamic business relationships.
In the example shown in Figure.4.17, the size of the wait queue and the number
of the maximal available atomic service providers are assumed to be ﬁve. Once this
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number is increased for complex systems, the constructed Markov chain will become
very complicated and even cannot be drawn explicitly, which is related to the issue of
state explosion [64]. To meet this challenge, we need research the application of high
level formalism, such as Petri nets [65], to model the dynamic business relationships
in a more abstract way. The current model assumes that every atomic service service
provider shares the same service rate. Taking into account the heterogeneous service
capability of diﬀerent atomic service providers is another extension that should be made
for the current model construction process.
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusions, Discussion and Future Work
Our research focuses on three facets of competitive service market: modeling, storage
design and SLA-based management. In this chapter, we conclude this dissertation with
a summary of the achieved results and the contributions to establishing a manageable
and economically feasible service market. We also brieﬂy summarize directions of future
work at the end of this chapter.
5.1 Conclusions
We have proposed and formalized the concept of a competitive service market, which
is created to capture the business dynamics generated by various types of service agents
interconnected under the framework of services computing. The structural hierarchy
consisting of atomic service provider and composite service provider clariﬁes their re-
spective positions held in the market. The supply and demand relationships among
service consumers, composite service providers and atomic service providers frame the
interconnections of the service chain in the service market. These complexities are in-
stantiated through a variety of constraints: functionality constraint, QoS constraint and
proﬁt constraint.
In order to provide quantitative support for the decision making processes of diﬀerent
market players, we have constructed stochastic models to conduct performance analysis
at diﬀerent levels spanning vertically on the structural hierarchy of the service market.
The queuing model is used as a uniﬁed approach to model the dynamic behaviors at the
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atomic service level. We have demonstrated how the fundamental performance metrics
are used to derive the compound metrics. The end-to-end response time for composite
service is one of the most widely studied performance metrics in services computing.
We have introduced the time-dependent system dynamics and discuss its eﬀect on the
response time computation. We have created a recursive procedure that keeps track of
the time diﬀerence between the starting time of the composite service and the starting
time of a participating atomic service. Using market-based availability as an example,
we have investigated the stochastic modeling approach at the market level. This line
of research not only creates a systematic analysis methodology which is multi-level and
metrics-dependent, but also delivers a set of operational solutions to assist various types
of decision makers in the market.
To gain a competitive edge in the service market, a service provider should be able
to deliver its service with diverse quality levels based on the requirements of the ser-
vice purchaser. In the context of service requirements analysis, we capture this fact
and classify the concept of service and the concept of service parameter conﬁguration in
terms of functional and non-functional features. The concept of service focuses on the
functionalities and the concept of service parameter conﬁguration centers around the
non-functional features. Moreover, we have structured the service discovery process into
a two-step procedure: ﬁrst, to ﬁnd the candidate that meets the functional requirements
of the customer; secondly, to determine the appropriate service parameter conﬁguration
that fulﬁlls the non-functional requirements. It is required to save both candidate ser-
vices and candidate service parameter conﬁgurations in the service registry and keep
track of their chaining relationships.
The combinatorial relationship between a single service and its associated service pa-
rameter conﬁgurations leads us to propose a scalable storage architecture that can handle
the large amount of service parameter conﬁgurations while supporting the two-stage ser-
vice discovery process. The designed architecture is composed of a set of decentralized
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storage units indexed by a centralized service array. We apply the counting Bloom ﬁlter
to design the storage unit and it has two features:
• The counting Bloom ﬁlter-based set membership evaluation criterion enables us
to block the service request which cannot ﬁnd the candidate service parameter
conﬁguration in a very eﬃcient way.
• The collection of candidate service parameter conﬁgurations is decomposed into a
set of linked lists, and the length of each linked list is monitored by the counter
value of the counting Bloom ﬁlter.
These two features are combined to minimize the number of comparison operations,
which determines the computational cost of this two-stage service discovery process. We
have developed an analytically solvable metrics, expected counter value in the counting
Bloom ﬁlter, to predict the performance of this system. Since this metric is a function
of the system parameter settings, the system performance is thus tunable by changing
system parameters. This feature is helpful to build a controllable system that is essential
for the system manageability.
The business relationships of diﬀerent market players are typically governed by the
service level agreements (SLAs). We systematically investigate the SLA design method-
ologies for every identiﬁed SLA design pattern. In order to capture the behavior of either
the negotiation counterpart or the market competitors, we develop Bayes estimator-
based scheme for the SLA design protocols in both the bilateral negotiation pattern and
sequential auction pattern. With the help of the learning capability provided by the
Bayes estimator, we are able to develop ﬂexible oﬀer proposition and bidding strate-
gies in accordance with diﬀerent SLA settlement criteria. The experimental results
demonstrate its eﬀectiveness. Instead of considering each SLA design instance as an in-
dependent event, we cast the dynamic business relationships framed through coexisting
SLA design protocols into a uniﬁed stochastic model based on Markov chain. We study
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a variety of performance metrics that can be analyzed using the constructed Markov
chain model, and how these performance metrics can help diﬀerent market players to
make both strategic and operational decisions.
In summary, the proposition of the concept of a competitive service market and
the involved interrelations enhance the business dimension of services computing, and
provide a framework to study the business behaviors of various types of service agents.
The modeling approaches not only deliver operational solutions to some important per-
formance metrics but also help to build a multi-level modeling framework. Guided by
the service requirements analysis, we design a scalable service storage architecture to
support the fast service discovery process while being able to keep track of large number
of service parameter conﬁgurations. We have systematically investigated the SLA de-
sign methodologies based on diverse business scenarios in the life cycle of a competitive
service market. The CTMC-based modeling approach captures the dynamic business re-
lationships in a uniﬁed system that can be quantitatively analyzed. These three facets of
our research are combined to form a foundation towards building a service management
system of the competitive service market.
5.2 Discussion: Service Demand Model in the Competitive
Service Market
In the current research setting, we assume that the payment scheme is “pay-per-
service instance”. Each invocation of an atomic service costs the composite service
provider a ﬁxed payment which is speciﬁed in the signed SLA. Once the pair of unit
payment and quality level is ﬁxed, the composite service provider will route the in-
coming atomic service request to this atomic service provider in accordance with a
pre-determined service selection protocol. The estimated number of invocation on an
atomic service provider is modeled as a demand function which takes the retail price
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and quality levels as the input parameters [66]. Here, the retail price is the one that
the composite service provider charges the consumer over this speciﬁc atomic service.
Equation.5.1 gives a generic form of demand function.
Mi = Di(P0, Qi) (5.1)
In Equation.5.1, the demand on the service provisioned by aspi is represented as a func-
tion of P0 and Qi. Qi denotes the quality level speciﬁed in the SLA signed between aspi
and cspo. P0 stands for the retail price that cspo will ask. Hence, P0−Pi represents the
net proﬁt for cspo by purchasing this speciﬁc atomic service for the scheduled composite
service. Here, Pi denotes the selling price speciﬁed in the SLA. In practice, empirical
study and statistical approaches are applied to construct the concrete demand func-
tions [67]. The demand function can be directly used to compute the utility function in
a proﬁt-driven business environment. The utility of an atomic service provider, aspi, is
computed as
Uaspi = Di(P0, Qi)× Pi − Ci(Qi) (5.2)
On the other hand, the utility function of the composite service provider by purchasing
this atomic service is given as follows.
Ucspo = P0 ×Di(P0, Qi)− Pi ×Di(P0, Qi) (5.3)
In Equation.5.2, C(Qi) represents the service delivery cost required to maintain the
pre-speciﬁed quality level of Qi, where the exact formula of Ci(·) depends on a variety
of factors, such as business capability of atomic service provider and the underlying
service infrastructure. For instance, the business operation cost is claimed to be able
to be modeled by the quadratic form of the quality level [68], e.g., 1
2
ςiQ
2
i . Here, ςi is a
constant and referred to as the quality level coeﬃcient.
Explicitly deﬁning the demand function enables us to formulate the utility in a well
structured function like Equation.5.2. However, we need to stress the fact that fulﬁll-
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ing this task heavily depends on the demand function which needs advanced modeling
approach and accumulated transaction data to get its accurate formula [69].
5.3 Future Work: Sequential SLA Design Using Stackelberg
Game
The SLA design scenarios investigated so far do not explicitly take other existing
SLAs into account. This simpliﬁcation does not fully expose the complicated business
scenarios that a SLA design process can get involved in. A typical scenario is that an
atomic service provider designs SLA together with the composite service provider. After
observing this signed SLA, another atomic service provider decides how to design its SLA
conﬁguration based on the observed information. These two sequential SLA designs can
be modeled as a Stackelberg game [54]. To diﬀerentiate with the SLA design patterns
discussed previously, we refer to this newly proposed pattern as the sequential SLA
design. In the Stackelberg game, the agents are classiﬁed as a leader and a follower.
The leader moves ﬁrst and makes a set of decisions which are observable to the follower
which will make its decision based on this observation. With respect to the sequential
SLA design, the ﬁrstly signed SLA functions as the leader while the secondly signed
SLA functions as the follower [54].
As a preliminary modeling eﬀort, we limit the number of involved atomic service
providers as two. The SLA ﬁrstly signed between asp1 and cspo is denoted as SLA1.
The other SLA secondly signed between asp2 and cspo is denoted as SLA2. A signed
SLA binds two agents. We can use a weighted sum of participating agents’ utilities as
the utility for a SLA.
U1(P0,1, P1, P2, Q1, Q2) = w1(P0,1 − P1)Dc1(P0,1, P0,2, Q1, Q2)
+w2(P1Dc1(P0,1, P0,2, Q1, Q2)− C1(Q1)) (5.4)
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Equation.5.4 computes the utility for the ﬁrstly designed SLA, SLA1. It takes the
payoﬀs of both sides into account. We use w1 and w2 to represent the diﬀerent weights
held by two counterparts. In Equation.5.4, (P0,1 − P1)Dc1(P0,1, P0,2, Q1, Q2) represents
the payoﬀ of cspo while (P1Dc1(P0,1, P0,2, Q1, Q2)−C1(Q1)) represents the payoﬀ of asp1.
Here, P0,1 represents the cspo’s retail price of the service that is purchased from asp1
through SLA1. The speciﬁcation of SLA1 determines the quality level of the service
and incurs a demand on this particular service parameter conﬁguration. The demand
on the service signed through SLA1 not only depends on its retail price and the speciﬁed
quality level, i.e., {P0,1, Q1}, but also depends on the competitive business relationship
framed by SLA2. For instance, a liner demand function to capture the competitor’s
eﬀect is given in Equation.5.5 [70].
Dc1(P0,1, P0,2, Q1, Q2) = α− θ1 × (P0,1 − P0,2) + θ2 × (Q1 −Q2) (5.5)
In Equation.5.5, a linear factor of θ1 measures the eﬀect of price diﬀerence and a linear
factor of θ2 measures the eﬀect of quality level diﬀerence, α is a constant. Similar to the
SLA1, the utility of SLA2 is given in Equation.5.6.
U2(P0,2, P1, P2, Q1, Q2) = w1(P0,2 − P2)Dc2(P0,2, P0,1, Q1, Q2)
+ w2(P2Dc2(P0,2, P0,1, Q1, Q2)− C(Q2)) (5.6)
Following the backward solution approach for solving Stackelberg game [54], the speci-
ﬁcation of SLA2 is solved through
P ∗0,2 = argmax{U2(P0,2, P ∗2 , Q∗2, |P0,1, P1, Q1} ∀P0,2 ∈ P0,2
P ∗2 = argmax{U2(P ∗0,2, P2, Q∗2, |P0,1, P1, Q1} ∀P2 ∈ P2
Q∗2 = argmax{U2(P ∗0,2, P ∗2 , Q2, |P0,1, P1, Q1} ∀Q2 ∈ Q2 (5.7)
The equilibrium solution for the speciﬁcation of SLA2 is obtained by assuming the
speciﬁcation of SLA1, and is solved in Equation.5.7. The results of Equation.5.7 imply
110
that P ∗0,2,P
∗
2 and Q
∗
2 are the functions of P
∗
0,1,P
∗
1 and Q
∗
1. Hence, we have
P ∗0,1 = argmax{U1(P0,1, P ∗1 , Q∗1} ∀P0,1 ∈ P0,1
P ∗1 = argmax{U1(P ∗0,1, P1, Q∗1} ∀P1 ∈ P1
Q∗1 = argmax{U1(P ∗0,1, P ∗1 , Q1} ∀Q1 ∈ Q1 (5.8)
In the above equations, P0,2,P2,Q2,P0,1,P1 andQ1 are the domains of the corresponding
variables. The above discussions just provide preliminary analysis of the sequential
SLA design using Stackelberg game formulation. In practice, solving Eq.5.7 and Eq.5.8
presents real challenges since the demand functions, Dc1 and Dc2 are not diﬀerentiable.
Some researches have been reported to numerically solve the real-world Stackelberg
games and can be applied to solve our problem [71][72].
We have discussed several SLA design patterns in both Chapter 4 and this section.
Future research would also include developing a generic service management console that
is able to instantiate a speciﬁc SLA design protocol in accordance with a given business
scenario. This requires a systematic decision making process to help selecting which
SLA design protocol should be used. The SLA design methodologies developed in the
above will constitute the candidate pool for this decision making process.
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